The World is sinking In Deep Mire
Barrels Of Middle East Speculation
Multiple Opinion from many Sources
Want to see gobs of Mid-East Chaos?
Then consider all the following Excerpts
Opinion as to what Israel will do is Multiple
Who knows what Jews or anyone else will Do
Middle East Decisions Are AS CLEAR AS Charcoal
Transparent Obama actions have made him Opaque
Obama has spent years covering up Opaque Decisions
No-Decision leader Obama’s Opaque in his foreign Policies.
Israeli Questions –To Go Or Not to Go, And When If They Do?
Obama’s Query – How do we hold Israel off past November 6th?
August 21, 2012
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
Begin Excerpt from YNet News
Will we really know?
Op-ed: US, Israel may wake up to nuclear Iran if they continue to rely solely on intelligence
Ronen Bergman
“If and when Iran decides to advance to the next stage and produce nuclear weapons, the US and Israel will know about it and share this information,” a senior American official said in an effort to allay concerns stemming from reports of differences of opinion between the sides, which may lead to an Israeli surprise attack in Iran.
But the most worrying aspect of this whole debate is the confidence both sides have in the quality of the intelligence information they have obtained. This is critical, because intelligence information indicating that the Iranians have begun to assemble the bomb would result in an immediate attack on its nuclear facilities.
Jerusalem and Washington agree that Iranian scientists have apparently assured Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that they would be able to build the first nuclear weapons production facility as soon as they are given the order to do so. Intelligence sources in Israel and the US claim they will “know when this happens,” but disagree on the response to such a development and on whether a preemptive military strike is necessary.
There is no doubt that the extensive efforts by US and Israeli intelligence agencies over the past decade have significantly increased the amount of intelligence information coming in from Iran. The discovery of facilities the Iranians were trying to conceal, alongside the planting of computer viruses and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists – all acts that were attributed to American and Israeli intelligence agencies – provide further proof of their efficiency. On the other hand, in light of past mistakes, one would expect the intelligence sources and leaders who rely on this information to be a little more modest.
For example, a senior source in Syria who worked for Israel from the 1970s through the 1990s warned on two separate occasions that Damascus was about to attack. These warnings almost resulted in a preventive Israeli strike – which was eventually avoided due to Washington’s intervention. The information was found to be false.
Israel and the US also believed they had good intelligence on Iraq during the 1980s, but they completely missed Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program, which almost reached the point where Iraq was capable of producing nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, in 2003 the US relied on intelligence information indicating that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, although it wasn’t.
What all these examples have in common is exaggerated enthusiasm and complete dependence on a limited number of sources, who are supposedly reliable. But this dependence may result in another blunder of historic proportions. What would happen, for instance, if Khamenei informs the nuclear scientists of his decision through new channels that are not exposed to the CIA or Mossad? And what would happen if the Iranians assemble a bomb at a facility that has yet to be discovered? The US and Israel, who are certain in the quality of their intelligence, may wake up too late and find out that Iran has already produced a nuclear bomb and there nothing they can do about it – at least not militarily.
Moreover, opposition elements may provide information that will lead Israel to attack Iran prematurely, before the diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program, including harsh economic sanctions, are exhausted. Without reliable intelligence information, Israel may be under the impression that it is attacking all of Iran’s nuclear plants, when in reality it would only be attacking some of them. The Middle East would pay a heavy price for such a blunder.
Weekend and Monday Excerpts from Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs/Daily Alert
17 to 20 August, 2012
Excerpt 1 from Israel Hayon
Will America Act Against Iran?
Dore Gold
Excerpt 1 from Israel Hayom
In the internal debate in Israel over Iran, it is assumed by many that at the end of the day the U.S. will destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure when it becomes clear that sanctions and negotiations have failed. But is that a reliable assumption? Writing in Ha’aretz on August 8, Israel’s former ambassador to the U.S., Sallai Meridor, warns that it cannot be assumed that Washington will act in the Iranian case. He correctly noted that in the past, the U.S. in fact condemned Israel’s 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and refused to take military action against the Syrian nuclear program.
The case of North Korea stands out as an instance in which the U.S. would not take action against a dangerous rogue state that was developing a nuclear weapons capability. In March 1994, North Korea blocked inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. By June, it appeared that the North Koreans were about to take the spent fuel rods from the reactor and extract enough weapons-grade plutonium for five or six bombs.
Just like today, high-level U.S. officials said that all options are on the table – but that was as far as they went. Negotiations were launched with North Korea that led to the signing of the “Agreed Framework,” which the North Koreans violated within a few years. In December 2002, North Korea removed the IAEA seals from the containers with the spent fuel rods and began to produce plutonium from them. North Korea then expelled the IAEA inspectors and announced in early 2003 that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Four years later on October 8, 2006, the North Koreans conducted their first underground test of an atomic bomb.
Why has the U.S. not taken more forceful action against rogue states crossing the nuclear threshold? First, there is the issue of intelligence. Even a superpower, like the U.S., may not have a sufficiently clear intelligence picture that would allow it to detect that a state like North Korea, which is isolated from the world, is about to conduct a nuclear test. This is also a problem for the American intelligence agencies in Iran. Just two years ago, secretary of defense Robert M. Gates was quoted as saying about the Iranians: “If their policy is to go to the threshold but not assemble a nuclear weapon, how do you tell that they have not assembled? I don’t actually know how you would verify that.”
Finally, it must be remembered that the U.S. is a superpower with global commitments. That means it has conflicting priorities, which constrain its ability to take on missions against rogue states that are in the last phase of assembling nuclear weapons. The Bush administration was focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, which undoubtedly affected its approach to North Korea – and later Syria. Perhaps, in the near future, the Obama administration will be involved in supporting an international intervention against the Assad regime in Syria, and will not be focused on the Iranian issue.
Thus, while the U.S. unquestionably has the military power to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the world’s most dangerous states or organizations, repeatedly, successive administrations have been reluctant to use their vast military capabilities for that purpose because of the international circumstances they faced.
The writer, a former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Excerpt 2 from Washington Institute for Near East Policy
What Will the U.S. Actually Do about Iran?
Patrick Clawson
Given Washington’s reactions to nuclear tests by North Korea, Pakistan, and India, Iranian leaders may well believe that harsh U.S. rhetoric about prevention and closing diplomatic windows does not reflect what the U.S. will actually do.
In addition, U.S. policymakers often fail to appreciate how deeply Israelis mistrust the notion of relying on foreign security guarantees. A formative experience for Israeli security doctrine came at a time of great need in June 1967, when President Lyndon Johnson refused to honor his predecessor’s explicit, written pledge guaranteeing security of navigation through the Straits of Tiran – a firm promise that had been central to Israel’s agreement to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in 1957. That episode reinforced the state’s founding principle: that the Jewish people can never rely on others to protect them. For many Israelis, this principle is the single most important guide to foreign policy.
It is difficult to send a tough message abroad during an election campaign, when a certain skepticism is warranted about whether presidential statements are aimed at the home audience rather than accurately reflecting what policy will be after the election. The writer is director of research at The Washington Institute. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
Begin Excerpt 3 from AFP
Top U.S. General: Israel, U.S. Differ on Urgency of Iran Threat
The U.S. and Israel have different interpretations of the same intelligence reports on Iran’s nuclear program, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Sunday. Dempsey said Israel viewed the threat posed by Tehran’s atomic ambitions with more urgency, as a nuclear-armed Iran could endanger Israel’s very existence. “You can take two countries and interpret the same intelligence and come out with two different conclusions,” he said.
Dempsey said he conferred with his Israeli counterpart Benny Gantz on a “bi-weekly” basis. “We compare intelligence, we discuss regional implications. And we’ve admitted to each other that our clocks are turning at different rates,” he said. “They are living with an existential concern that we are not living with.” (AFP)
Begin Excerpt 4 from Israel Hayom
Israeli Attack on Iran Won’t Create a Rift with the U.S.
Shlomo Cesana and Yoni Hirsch
“There is no crisis with the United States” regarding the necessity and timing of possible military action against Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren told Israel Hayom on Saturday. “The Americans hear the threats made by Iran’s leaders, who want to destroy Israel. It is clear to me that the Americans are asking themselves, ‘What would we do in their place?'” he said.
“If Israel ultimately decides to take action against Iran, we will receive extremely widespread support from the American people and Congress, and President [Barack] Obama will continue to recognize our right to defend ourselves on our own. It won’t create a rift with the United States.”
According to Oren, the only question is “the responsibility for the security of Israel, which lies with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the government. It is a responsibility that no sovereign country would cast on another country, even if that country is its best friend in the world, like the U.S. is to Israel.”
Former Israel Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. (ret.) Herzl Bodinger told Israel’s Channel 1 TV: “If you ask me, I think we should have bombed the [Iranian] installations in 2005, when there was only one site, and then we wouldn’t be faced with all these questions.” “I am almost certain that the world won’t be able to prevent Iran’s nuclear militarization through sanctions, and when they have a bomb we will be in a completely different situation….We are very appreciative of American help and their support, but at the end of the day you stand by yourself, with your own fate. If we attack, missiles will fall here, but they will also fall here if the Americans attack.”
“The Chairman of the [U.S.] Joint Chiefs of Staff said this week that in his opinion Israel will not be able to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations, but I think he isn’t totally in the know about what the Israeli forces are capable of. The Americans don’t know everything about us.”
(Israel Hayom)
Begin Excerpt 5 from Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Israel Debates a Strike on Iran
Michael Herzog
Most Israelis believe that Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. They also regard a nuclear-armed Iran as a mortal threat to their country’s future and are highly skeptical that international sanctions and diplomacy will curtail Tehran’s aims. Therefore, the debate in Israel focuses on the cost-effectiveness of a unilateral Israeli strike, as well as its timing and potential impact on U.S.-Israeli relations.
Implicit in the position of Israeli decision-makers is deep skepticism regarding whether Washington will ultimately deliver on its commitment to keep Iran from going nuclear. They frequently cite the failure to curtail Pakistan and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions despite U.S. commitments to do so. At the same time, Israelis are well aware of the fact that they will depend on Washington’s support the day after a preemptive strike, particularly in leading the crucial international campaign to prevent Iran from reconstituting its nuclear capabilities.
The intensifying public debate in Israel is, first and foremost, a testimony to the fact that the country is nearing a decision on Iran, probably in the coming weeks. If Washington wants to influence Israeli decision-making, it must reach out to its ally at the highest level both publicly and privately, presenting a clearer roadmap that seriously addresses Israel’s concerns. Such a dialogue cannot wait until after the U.S. election.
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Michael Herzog is a Washington Institute international fellow.
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
Begin Excerpt 6 from the Washington Post
Five Steps Obama Can Take to Avert an Israeli Strike on Iran
Amos Yadlin
(Washington Post)
The U.S. should take five immediate steps to convince allies and adversaries alike that military action is real, imminent and doable – which are key to making it less likely.
*Obama should notify the U.S. Congress in writing that he reserves the right to use military force to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.
*Washington should signal its intentions via a heightened U.S. military presence in the gulf, military exercises with Middle East allies and missile defense deployment in the region. Media coverage of these actions should be encouraged.
*Washington should provide advanced military technology and intelligence to strengthen Israel’s military capabilities and extend the window in which Israel can mortally wound Iran’s program.
*U.S. officials should speak publicly about the dangers of possible Iranian nuclear reconstitution in the wake of a military strike. If Iran sees military action by Israel or the West as an absolute end to its nuclear ambitions, it will be more reluctant to risk things.
*Obama should publicly commit to the security of U.S. allies in the gulf. This would credibly anchor the U.S. last-resort military option to three powerful interests: U.S. national security, Israeli security and the security of allied states.
Israel cannot afford to outsource its security to another country. But if the U.S. wants Israel to give sanctions and diplomacy more time, Israelis must know that they will not be left high and dry if these options fail.
Ironically, the best assurance the U.S. president can give Israel is a commitment to, if all else fails, resort to military action to protect critical U.S. interests. But time is running out to make this commitment credible to the people of the U.S., Israel and Iran. As the adage goes, if you want peace, prepare (credibly) for war.
The writer, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, is director of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies.
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