Only God can keep Iron and Clay United Together!
April 9, 2007
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
A Current Day Example of the impossibility of Clay and Iron Islamic Factions holding together for very long without Divine Intervention!
Daniel 2:42-44 – And as the toes of the feet were part of iron, and part of clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong, and partly broken. [43] And whereas thou sawest iron mixed with miry clay, they shall mingle themselves with the seed of men: but they shall not cleave one to another, even as iron is not mixed with clay. [44] And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever.
Revelation 17:17 – For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.
Revelation 12:6 – And the woman fled into the wilderness, where she hath a place prepared of God, that they should feed her there a thousand two hundred and threescore days.
It will take an act of God putting it in their hearts to stay united long enough in agreement to fulfill his end time
will. The two articles which follow reveal how difficult it is to get the Islamic factions to agree on any issue for a long period of time. The “days of these kings” will be the “1260 days” that Israel is confined in the Negev Wilderness, and they will hold together during that period, but will slip apart to be consumed at Armageddon when Jesus Christ returns to “set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed.”
The two articles which follow demonstrate the frailty of the bond that now holds the iron and clay together by their recent Mecca Agreement. It reflects the frailty of any bond that holds different Arab clay and iron nations and factions together.
Begin Jerusalem Post Article
PA fears UN may order all aid workers out of lawless Gaza
Khaled Abu Toameh, THE JERUSALEM POST
April 5, 2007
Palestinian Authority officials on Thursday expressed fear that the United Nations may formally declare the Gaza Strip a dangerous zone – a move that would result in the evacuation of the remaining foreign nationals from the area and drastically hamper international humanitarian aid to the Palestinians.
PA security sources told The Jerusalem Post that 25 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza Strip last month in internal fighting. Another four were killed in the West Bank, the sources added.
“We’re moving very quickly toward such a scenario,” said Yasser Abed Rabbo, member of the PLO executive committee and a close aide to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. “The Gaza Strip is full of thugs and gangsters who are responsible for the ongoing anarchy. Soon the Gaza Strip may be declared a dangerous zone, which means that all international organizations would have to leave.”
The UN has yet to issue any formal statement to such effect.
Chief PA negotiator Saeb Erekat warned that a “dangerous zone” declaration would increase the suffering of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and called on the PA security forces to start working to end the state of lawlessness and anarchy.
“The Gaza Strip has become worse than Somalia,” a prominent human rights activist in Gaza City told the Post. “Thousands of gunmen continue to roam the streets and the new government hasn’t done anything to restore law and order. Every day you hear horror stories about people who are killed and wounded.
The situation is really intolerable.”
Muhammad Dahlan, who was recently appointed PA National Security Adviser, said it was time to admit that a “curse has hit” the Gaza Strip. “Anyone who does not admit that there’s a curse in the Gaza Strip does not know what he’s talking about,” he said.
Dahlan expressed concern over the wave of kidnappings in Gaza, noting that a local engineer who was abducted several months ago was still being held by his captors. He said that the National Security Council was now preparing a security plan that would end the state of anarchy in the PA-controlled areas.
“The Palestinian security establishment needs to undergo major surgery,” he added. “The situation is catastrophic and many young men prefer to work for clans and not the security forces.”
Dahlan met earlier with the British consul-general in Jerusalem, Richard Makepeace, and briefed him on the PA’s efforts to release kidnapped BBC correspondent Alan Johnston, who was snatched by masked gunmen in Gaza City three weeks ago.
Hassan Khraisheh, deputy speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, said that the commanders of the PA security forces knew where Johnston was being held, but were doing nothing to release him. “What’s the point in having 85,000 security officers if they can’t free a foreign journalist who has been held in the Gaza Strip for three weeks?” he asked.
Dozens of Palestinian journalists demonstrated outside Abbas’s office in Gaza City on Thursday to protest against the abduction of Johnston. Addressing the journalists, Abbas said he was doing his utmost to secure the release of the BBC corespondent.
“This case will be resolved very soon,” he said without elaborating. “We will not allow such things to recur.” Abbas’s bodyguards fired into the air to prevent the protesters from approaching his office.
No one was hurt.
Abbas and PA Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh agreed to form a joint “operations command” to follow up on the case of Johnston.
The new PA government is expected to hold an emergency meeting in Gaza City on Saturday to discuss ways of restoring law and order. But many Palestinians in the Gaza Strip expressed pessimism, saying it was too late to talk about ending the state of chaos.
“There are too many gangs and weapons out there,” said the human rights activist.
“No government will be able to create a new situation.”
He pointed out that at least 46 civilians had been kidnapped in the Gaza Strip in the past four weeks. The latest kidnappings took place on Thursday, when unidentified gunmen abducted three people, including one woman, in separate incidents.
Most of the kidnappings were related to family feuds and rivalries between political groups, particularly Fatah and Hamas.
Also Thursday, the bullet-riddled body of a Hamas security official, Muhammad Abu Hajileh, was discovered east of Gaza City. Abu Hajileh was a member of Hamas’s “Executive Force” in the Gaza Strip.
End Jerusalem Post Article
Begin Washington Institute for Near East Policy Article
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Begin Excerpted Select Paragraph Quotes from Policy Watch #1219
How Long Can the Palestinian Unity Government Last?
By Mohammad Yaghi
April 4, 2007
On March 18, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) overwhelmingly approved a new unity government by a vote of 83 to 3. This lopsided result does not reflect the many internal and cross-factional tensions that will ultimately undercut the current Fatah-Hamas coalition. Within both factions, the center of gravity is shifting toward hardline elements that favor political confrontation over accommodation. As these elements continue to consolidate control, existing tensions between the rival parties will be exacerbated, affecting the future of the Palestinian unity government from within.
Fatah’s Two Rival Camps
Since Hamas won the January 2006 legislative elections, Fatah has been divided between two blocs: one that favors the unity arrangement with Hamas and one that prefers confrontation.
Those who believe that a unity arrangement with Hamas will maximize Fatah’s current authority include a loose coalition of imprisoned Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti, his followers, and the old guard leaders of the Fatah Central Committee — including Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), Hani al-Hassan, Abbas Zaki, and Farouq Kaddoumi, the Tunis-based nominal head of Fatah and rival to President Mahmoud Abbas. Countering them are second-tier Fatah leaders who prefer that the party both remain an opposition movement and pressure Hamas to accept the conditions set down by the Quartet (the United States, Russia, the UN, and the European Union) for alleviating the political and economic boycott of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This faction is headed by Muhammad Dahlan and backed by many members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, including Saeb Erekat, Nabil Amr, and Azzam al-Ahmad, as well as the leaders of the Preventive Security and intelligence services.
The Dahlan bloc eventually backed the unity agreement because Hamas’s better-organized forces defeated Fatah during armed clashes in Gaza. Nevertheless, it views the accord as a temporary truce to be abandoned when Fatah regains confidence, strength, and resources.
Toward this end, it seeks to undermine those who favor accommodating Hamas and has succeeded in doing so in several ways:
Dahlan’s stature within Fatah has grown in recent weeks. Abbas appointed him secretary of the National Security Council, empowering him to reform the security forces and strengthen the presidential guard.
Fatah has improved its public outreach efforts by appointing two spokesmen — Jamal Nazal in the West Bank and Abdul-Hakim Awad in Gaza — to focus primarily on criticizing
and exposing Hamas activities through media outlets and popular websites.
Four of Fatah’s six ministers are Dahlan allies.
They include Azzam al-Ahmad, who is also deputy prime minister; Minister of Transportation Sadi al-Krunz; Minister of Public Works Samih al-Abed; and Minister of Health Radwan al-Akhras. Moreover, some of Barghouti’s traditional allies are joining Dahlan’s camp in fear of Hamas ambitions to control the PA and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
In early March, Abbas appointed Fatah leadership committees for the West Bank and Gaza. The former is headed by Hussein al-Sheikh, Dahlan’s ally and Barghouti’s archrival. It is still unclear what the mandate of these committees will be, but the appointment was clearly aimed at strengthening Dahlan’s network at the expense of Barghouti’s.
Dahlan and his allies may be improving their internal position within Fatah, but they continue to face significant obstacles and will have to remain unified if they are going to take over the party.
The Resurgence of Hamas Hardliners
In a speech delivered shortly after the formation of the unity government, former Hamas foreign minister Mahmoud al-Zahar signaled that hardliners within the group do not favor the terms of the Mecca accord. Using the phrase “we in Hamas” to suggest that his opinion represents that of Hamas’s religious leadership in the Shura Council, al-Zahar countered three specific points of the unity government platform: (1) Hamas will not extend its ceasefire with Israel to the West Bank unless Israel withdraws completely from all lands occupied in 1967; (2) while Hamas would accept a Palestinian state with temporary borders — since this does not require a peace agreement with Israel — it refuses a permanent state within the 1967 borders, which would be equivalent to recognizing Israel; (3) Hamas opposes giving the PLO a mandate to negotiate with Israel until all Palestinian factions are represented in the organization, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Al-Zahar’s speech has several implications for the future of the unity government. First, it preserves Hamas’s right to terminate the agreement if Fatah refuses to reform the PLO and incorporate Hamas into the PA’s senior administration. Second, it indicates Hamas’s independent position on truce terms with Israel. Third, it reflects Hamas leaders’ concern that the military wing will shift loyalties to more extreme Islamist groups if it perceives its political leadership to be softening.
At its core, Hamas does not want to appear as if unity with Fatah has forced it to relinquish its goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state encompassing all of historic Palestine.
For example, when the Mecca accord was announced, Osama bin-Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahari, accused Hamas of selling Palestine for a few seats in the unity government. Hamas responded with an official statement: “Palestine is an Islamic endowment. No one has the right to abandon one inch of its soil, and Hamas holds firm to this principle.”
Fault Lines in the Unity Government
There are three main areas in which Hamas aspires to expand its influence and ultimately replace Fatah, each representing one of Fatah’s traditional sources of power: (1) the security forces, (2) the institutions of the PA, and (3) the PLO. Consequently, Fatah and Hamas will find implementing the Mecca accord — and the related articles of the unity government platform — to be nearly impossible.
Hamas has already succeeded in infiltrating many of the security forces. During the confrontations with Fatah, for example, the police and national security forces — traditionally loyal to Fatah — remained neutral, leaving only the presidential guard, Preventive Security, and general intelligence as active combatants against Hamas.
The Mecca accord stipulates that the senior PA positions, which Fatah dominates, be divided between the two parties.
The PA’s limited resources and the aspirations of both sides to gain positions for their followers will create struggles over every appointment. Fatah’s health minister has already dismissed numerous Hamas appointees to his ministry.
The future of the PLO. Hamas may have empowered Abbas to negotiate with Israel under the umbrella of the PLO, but it placed two significant checks on his authority. According to the unity government’s platform, “any offer on any final agreement should be presented to the new Palestinian National Council for ratification or to hold a general referendum [for] the Palestinian people inside and abroad”; also required would be an unspecified “law that organizes this referendum.” In other words, the legislative body of a refashioned PLO (where Hamas contends it should compose the majority) must endorse any agreement that Abbas reaches with Israel, either directly or through a popular referendum held not only in the PA but also among refugee populations in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.
Conclusion
It is difficult to envision a stable, durable Palestinian unity government. If the hardline factions within each party continue to gain strength, differences between their leadership will become irreconcilable. Fatah hardliners seek to oust Hamas and restore their lost authority, while Hamas hardliners are uncompromising in their policies against Israel and Fatah. Under such conditions, the unity government is likely to fracture along three major fault lines: the mission and composition of the security forces, the distribution of PA offices, and the future of the PLO. Meanwhile, ongoing factional violence — including frequent kidnappings and assassinations — threatens to return the streets of Gaza to a state of war. In the end, the unity government is just a tactical truce — to be undone when one party believes unity no longer serves its interests.
Mohammad Yaghi is a Lafer international fellow with The Washington Institute and a columnist for the Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.
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