DANIEL TOES ARE GENUINE FOES
IT SHALL TAKE THE POWER OF GOD
TO HOLD SUNNI & SHIITE CLAY & IRON
TOES IN ANY BOND FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD
DUE TO MANY CENTURIES OF INTENSE HATRED!
PART 6
September 14, 2010
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
FOR A FULL EXPOSITION OF THIS SUBJECT READ ARCHIVE PROPHECY UPDATE NUMBERS 233B, 234A, 235A, 236A, AND 236B ON OUR WEB SITE
Daniel 2:43,44 – And whereas thou sawest iron mixed with miry clay, they shall mingle themselves with the seed of men: but they shall not cleave one to another, even as iron is not mixed with clay.
[44] And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever.
Revelation 17:13,17 – These have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beast. [17] For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan will not be among the 10 toes/horns that initially attack Israel, but they will fall to the Antichrist who leads the 10 toes, and will be a part of his Caliphate Kingdom.
The initial 10 toes/horns will be Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Sudan.
Begin Excerpt from an Article in IRMA via THE HUDSON INSTITUTE
(CONTINUED FROM PART 5)
The Shiites of Saudi Arabia
by Joshua Teitelbaum
Published on Saturday, August 21, 2010
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 10
Hudson Institute, Inc. 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor Washington, DC 20005
The Saudi regime is caught between its Wahhabi roots and wishes by some in the royal family, particularly Abdallah, to effect reconciliation with the Shiites. A graphic illustration of this dilemma is shown by examples from two web sites
. A Saudi Sunni rabidly anti-Shiite website, al-Furqan, published a “document” stating that according to Shiite calculations, Abdallah would be killed on December 18, 2007,
which is one month before the coming of the Shiite Mahdi.49 On the other hand, the Shiite al-Rasid site published a tongue-in-cheek article entitled “King Abdallah is a Shiite” which expressed support for Abdallah, as a challenge to those who would saythat they were more loyal to Iran than Saudi Arabia.50 In May 2007, Sunni activists hacked Saffar’s website and published the following message: “In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate: All rawafid websites will be attacked and all sites belonging to the Majus (pagan Zoroastrians-a reference to Iran) will be removed from the Internet.51
In general, over the years there has been some improvement in the lot of the Shiites of Saudi Arabia. They are allowed to hold Ashura commemorations, publish Shiite works, open Shiite mosques and Shiite schools, albeit all in a very slow and highly crutinized manner.52 Even so, Saudi Shiites never stop worrying that their hard-won gains may evaporate one day and they do not have faith in the government. Paradoxically, the gains of their Iraqi brethren might cause them to lose what they have achieved in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Sunnis accuse Saudi Shiites of funding terrorism against Sunnis in Iraq, while Saudi Shiites accuse Saudi Sunnis of funneling funds to Sunni terrorists in Iraq. Saudi Shiites are also worried ab out
extremists in their midst. 53 In the village of Awwamiya, some residents were reported to be carrying automatic weapons and wearing necklaces with a picture of Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah.54 Saudi Shiites continue to be divided between those who favor further dialogue and those who want a more confrontational approach, while all Shiites perceive a lack of momentum regarding reform. Leaders such as Ja’afar al-Shayib, Muhammad Mahfuz and Hasan al-Saffar support continued engagement with the regime
and the conservative Sunni elements of Saudi society, while others, such as the cleric Nimr al-Nimr pursue a more militant line. Some leaders have even proposed the establishment of a Saudi Shiite marja al-taqlid (source of religious emulation) in order to allay Sunni fears that the Saudi Shiites are influenced by Shiite clerics in Iran and Iraq.55
Meanwhile, those Shiite activists favoring dialogue are reaching out. Saffar has traveled to the Wahhabi stronghold of Unayza to meet clerics, and has invited them to visit him in the Eastern Province.56 In April 2010, Saffar appeared on a televised debate with al-Barrak. While no progress was made, the Shiites could point to the fact that Barrak was willing to appear with Saffar as an indication that the pproach of those favoring dialogue was making headway.57
In order to preserve their gains, the Shiites believe it is necessary for King Abdallah to speak out against anti-Shiite fatwas; indeed, they argue that such fatwas should be criminalized.58 Otherwise, they maintain, matters run the danger of returning to the problematic 1980s. But it is likely the Saudi Shiites will be disappointed. Relations between the regime and the Shiite population are fraught with difficulty. Given the reliance of the regime on the Sunni Wahhabi clerics, it is unlikely that they will rein them in. The situation in Iraq has made it much harder to do so. The royal family feels keenly its role as a leader of the Sunni world, and local Sunnis are pressuring the regime to support the Sunnis in Iraq. In the face of the regional Shiite ascendancy marked by Hezbollah’s performance against Israel, a possible Shiite state in Iraq, and a powerful Iran, it is likely that Saudi Shiites will continue to pay the price of being the ultimate “Other,”sacrificed on the altar of the Wahhabi legitimacy on which the regime is so dependent.
Joshua Teitelbaum is Principal Research Associate, Global Research International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, and Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution and Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University
This article will appear in Volu
me 10 of Current Trends in Islamist Ideology published by Hudson Institute.
Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Shia, Sunni Wahabi, Iran, Iraq
Notes
[1] On Saudi regional mediation efforts, see Joseph Kostiner, “Saudi Regional Strategy: The Power of Mediation,” Tel AvivNotes, March 25, 2007, online at ttp://www.dayan.org.
[2] See Meir Litvak, “Worse than the Jews: The Anti-Shiite Polemics of Sunni
Islamic Radicalism,” in Tamar Yegnes (ed.), Sunna and Shi’a: The Changing
Balance of Power (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 2008), pp. 43-57 (Hebrew).
[3] On the history of the Shiites in Saudi Arabia, see: Guido Steinberg,
“The Shiites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia al-Ahsa, 1913-1953,” in
Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende (eds.), The Twelver Shia in Modern Times:
Religious Culture and Political History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), pp.
236-251; Fuad Ibrahim, The Shi’is of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi, 2006). See
also Werner Ende, “The Nakhawila: A Shiite Community in Medina, Past and
Present,” Die Welt des Islams, Vol.
37, No. 3 (November 1997), pp. 263-348.
[4] On Shiite terrorism, see Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi
Arabia’s Islamic Opposition (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 2001), chapter 6.
[5] Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), pp. 199-200.
[6] “The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia,” International Crisis Group,
September 19, 2005; Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Franke, The Arab Shia: The
Forgotten Muslims (New York: Palgrave, 1999), p. 180.
[7] The Qatif hawza was known as “little Najaf.” The authorities appear to
be exercising benign neglect with two currently operating hawzas: one in
Qatif and one in al-Hasa. “Shiite Question.”
[8] For more details on the implications for the Shiites of the capture of
al-Hasa, see Steinberg.
[9] “Shiite Question.” Steinberg raised the possibility that until
the Saudi
conquest Shiites may have even formed the majority in al-Hasa.
[10] Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), pp. 199-200.
[11] Steinberg, pp. 248-249.
[12] “Shiite Question.”
[13] Ibrahim, p. 33.
[14] Toby Jones, “Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity,
Modernization, Marginalization, and the Shia Uprising of 1979,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.
38, No. 2 (May 2006), pp.
213-233. While the regime was busy putting down a Shiite uprising in the
Eastern province, Wahhabi radicals took over the Great Mosque in Mecca. On
this incident, see Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou, pp
.
19-22, and Yaroslav
Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest
Shrine and the Birth of al-Qaeda (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
[15] Ibrahim, p. 33.
[16] Hasan al-Saffar, Kalimat al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, p. 30, quoted in
Ibrahim, p. 132.
[17] Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou, pp.
49-71.
[18] Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of
Cultural Authenticity,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25 (1998),
pp. 121-138; Mamoun Fandy, “From Confrontation to Creative Resistance,”
Critique (Fall 1996), pp. 1-27; Joshua Teitelbaum, “Saudi Arabia,” in Ami
Ayalon, (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) 1993 (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1995), pp. 575-600; “What Future for the Saudi-Shiite Accord?,”
Mideast Mirror Vol. 8, No. 54, March 18, 1994.
[19] See al-Diyar, October 13, 1993; Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Saudi Officials
Reporting Accord with Shiite Foes,” New York Times, October 29, 1993, p.
A11; al-Quds al-Arabi, November 1, 1993; al Alam, November 13, 1993; for
Shiite oppositionist attacks on the Saudi regime, see various issues of
al-Jazira al-Arabiyya and Arabia Monitor, as well as the article in the
summer 1993 issue of Arab Review, detailing Saudi abuse of holy sites in
Mecca and Medina.”
[20] See al Alam, November 13, 1993.
[21] “Shiite Question.”
[22] “Shiite Question.”
[23] “Shiite Question.”
[24] Al-Nasr, October 1993, quoted in Ibrahim, p.
196.
[25] Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou, pp. 84-94. The most recent study of
Hezbollah al-Hijaz and its clerical wing, Tajammu Ulama al-Hijaz, is Toby
Matthiesen, “Hezbollah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi’a
Opposition Group.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, no. 2 (Spring 2010), pp.
179-197.
[26] Quds al-Arabi, January 30, February 14, 2003; “Shiite Question.”
[27] Washington Post, April 22; AFP, 23, 24 April; arabicnews.com, April 24;
al-Quds al-Arabi, May 1; Los Angeles Times, May 8, 2003.
[28] For the text of the petition, see al-Quds al-Arabi, May 1, 2003.
[29] Joshua Teitelbaum, “Terrorist Challenges to Saudi Arabian Internal
Security,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3
(September 2005), pp. 1-11.
[30] AFP, June 18, 21 2003; “Shiite Question.”
[31] Toby Jones, “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report, No.
237 (Winter 2005).
[32] “Shiite Question;” AFP, March 3, 2005.
[33] April 10, 2006, http://www.rasid.com/artc.php?id=10664; April 12, 2006,
http://www.rasid.com/artc.php?id=10698; April 17, 2006,
http://www.rasid.com/artc.php?id=10771. Al-Rasid is a Saudi Shiite website.
[34] Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2006.
[35] F. Gregory Gause, “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power
Balance, and the Sectarian Question,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 6, No. 2
(March 2007),
[36] Demonstrations with participants carrying pictures of Hezbollah leader
Hasan Nasrallah were reported to have been held in Qatif in July and August.
Several arrests were made. In October, during Ramadan, the authorities
arrested four more Shiites after they brandished a Hezbollah dinner at an
iftar gathering. July 21, 2006, http://www.rasid.com/artc.php?id=12054;
Haaretz (English edition), October 17, 2006.
[37] AP, August 4, 5, 2006.
[38] Federal Broadcast Information Service, OSC Report, August 16, 2006;
Middle East Times, July 24, 2006.
[39] See the article explaining Bin Jibrin’s position on the al-Arabiyya
website at http://www.alarabiya.net/Articles/2006/08/08/26443.htm.
[40] Ibrahim, p. 197; Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou, p. 46.
[41] http://www.islamlight.net/Files/Rwafeth/.
[42] Federal Broadcast Information Service, OSC Report, August 16, 2006.
[43] htttp://www.islamlight.net/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=3818;
Reuters, December 11, 2006.
[44] December 17, 2006,
http://albarrak.islamlight.net/index.php?option=com_ftawa&task=view&id=18080&Itemid=7,
cited in Gause. See also FBIS, Saudi Clerics Roundup, 19-23 February 2007.
[45] January 21, 2007, http://www.ibn-jebreen.com/printnew.php?page=8.
[46] October 24, 2006, http://www.middle-east-online.com.
[47] Kuwait Times, November 21, 2006.
[48] Al-Siyasa, January 27, 2007.
[49] http://www.alfrqan.com/docs.phtp?docid=65, February 28, 2007.
[50] http://www.rasid.com/artc.php?id=9943, February 20, 2006.
[51] FBIS, OSC Report, May 11, 2007.
[52] AP, January 30, 2007; Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2006; New York
Times, February 5, 2007; Department of State, Saudi Arabia: “Country Report
on Human Rights Practices 2006,” March 6, 2007.
[53] FBIS, “OSC Report on terrorist websites,” February 12, 2007.
[54] AP, February 3, 2007.
[55] Fred Wehrey, “Shi’a Pessimistic About Reform, but Seek Reconciliation,”
Arab Reform Bulletin, August 19, 2008.
[56] Wehrey, “Shi’a Pessimistic.”
[57] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 15, 2010.
[58] Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 2007.
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