DANIEL TOES ARE GENUINE FOES
IT SHALL TAKE THE POWER OF GOD
TO HOLD SUNNI & SHIITE CLAY & IRON
TOES IN ANY BOND FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD
DUE TO MANY CENTURIES OF INTENSE HATRED!
PART 5
September 14, 2010
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
FOR A FULL EXPOSITION OF THIS SUBJECT READ ARCHIVE PROPHECY UPDATE NUMBERS 233B, 234A, 235A, 236A, AND 236B ON OUR WEB SITE
I believe the initial 10 toes/horns the Antichrist will lead are Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq.
But many Arab countries will be overthrown as he conquers the glorious land from Dan to Beersheba and Egypt.
Many will be overthrown from within by the Shiite minorities within them, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Daniel 11:40,41 – And at the time of the end shall the king of the south push at him: and the king of the north shall come against him like a whirlwind, with chariots, and with horsemen, and with many ships; and he shall enter into the countries, and shall overflow and pass over. [41] He shall enter also into the glorious land, and many countries shall be overthrown:
The king of the south is the leader of Israel – The king of the north is the leader of the 10 toes – The glorious land is Israel – The overthrown countries are those who did not join Syria and Iran and the other 8 in the initial counterattack by the king of the north against the king of the south.
Daniel 2:41-44 – And whereas thou sawest the feet and toes, part of potters’ clay, and part of iron, the kingdom shall be divided; but there shall be in it of the strength of the iron, forasmuch as thou sawest the iron mixed with miry clay. [42] And as the toes of the feet were part
of iron, and part of clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong, and partly broken. [43] And whereas thou sawest iron mixed with miry clay, they shall mingle themselves with the seed of men: but they shall not cleave one to another, even as iron is not mixed with clay.
[44] And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these
kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever.
Revelation 17:13,17 – These have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beast. [17] For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan will not be among the 10 toes/horns that initially attack Israel, but they will submit to the Antichrist who leads the 10 toes, and will be a part of his Caliphate Kingdom.
Excerpt from an Article in IRMA via THE HUDSON INSTITUTE
(CONTINUED FROM PART 4)
The Shiites of Saudi Arabia
by Joshua Teitelbaum
Published on Saturday, August 21, 2010
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol.
10
Hudson Institute, Inc. 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor Washington, DC 20005
www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiites-of-saudi-arabia
There were two important events in 2005 for Saudi Arabia’s Shiites. One was the accession of Abdallah to the throne in August, following the death of King Fahd.
The other was the elections held for the Saudi municipal councils. When Abdallah became King, the Shiites thought their moment had finally arrived. He was the champion of reform and religious tolerance. A busload of leaders and clerics from the Eastern Province traveled to Riyadh to pledge their loyalty, or baya. A Shiite activist was quoted as saying, “I have never seen anything like this.”31
In the spring of 2005, national elections were held for municipal councils. These were the first such elections in over forty years. Although some more radical Shiite clerics declared a boycott of the elections, Shaykh Saffar’s policy of engagement carried the day. Coming on the heels of the Shiite victory in the January 2005 Iraqi elections, Saffar pointed to Iraq as an example of the need to participate in the process. The turnout was relatively high, even higher than in the rest of the kingdom. Even though the actual positions contested were for half the seats in powerless municipal councils (the other half being appointees), the campaign itself and the very fact that their vote counted was eason for great optimism among the Shiites.They won nearly all of the seats they contested.32
While Shiite participation in elections was reason for celebration, the Shiite ascendancy, which became evident in Iraq during 2005 and into 2006, increased tension between Sunnis and Shiites in the kingdom.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s remarks in March 2005 that Shiites were more loyal to Iran than their own countries elicited a flood of protests from Saudi Shiites, particularly since no one in the Saudi government found it necessary to contradict Mubarak and attest to the loyalty of Saudi Shiites.33 But the perception on the part of Saudi Sunnis that Saudi Shiites were more loyal to Iran was very widespread, according to leading liberal Turki al-Hamad. “I’d say 90 percent of the people in Saudi Arabia don’t
trust the Shiites,” he averred.34
The war in Lebanon in 2006, during which Hezbollah attacked Israeli cities and appeared triumphant, only worsened matters for Saudi Shiites.
While Abdallah had been ready to meet publicly with Shiites (he was photographed with Saffar at the 2003 National Dialogue),35 Hezbollah’s popularity in the Arab world and its destabilization of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon was more than he could bear. The government came out strongly against Hezbollah and Iran, calling Hezbollah’s kidnapping of Israeli soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser “rash adventures carried out by elements inside the state and those behind them.” At the same time, there were pro-Hezbollah demonstrations in the Eastern province.36 With this background, Abdallah was not able-or did not want-to restrain the traditional Wahhabi anti-Shiite polemics from bursting forth. At a time of Shiite ascendancy, the leading Sunni state could not be seen as coddling
the Shiites.
The prominence of Hezbollah during the July 2006 war led to a discussion of the organization in particular, and by implication the Shiites in general, as well as the Shiites in Saudi Arabia. Safar al-Hawali, once of the opposition “Awakening Shaykhs,” who became popular in the 1990s and still maintained his distance from the regime, castigated Hezbollah (the Party of God) as “Hizb al-Shaytan” (the Party of the Devil), and said that it was forbidden to pray for it or to support it in any way. His former partner in the opposition of the 1990s, now closer to the regime, Salman al-Awda, exhibited a more Arab nationalist bent, saying that while there were disputes with the Shiites, “I, as a Muslim and an Arab, feel happy when
Hezbollah inflicts damage on the Zionists, and we should praise the resistance in the media.”37 The dividing line between the two oppositionists was clear. Hawali had boycotted the 2003 National Dialogue with the Shiites, while Awda had attended.
Extremist Wahhabi shaykhs continued to point out the “evil nature” of the Shiites. During the Lebanon war, a fatwa appeared on the internet by leading Sunni Shaykh Abdallah bin Jibrin, a former member of the establishment Senior Ulama Council, calling on Sunnis to disavow Hezbollah as a party of rawafid that was anti-Sunni.38 Although Bin Jibrin later said this was an old fatwa that was no longer applicable to the present situation,39 his anti-Shiite views were well known, and he had even called for Shiites’ deaths in a fatwa published in 1991.40
Websites run by less established but still popular clerics published virulently anti-Shiite polemics.
The Nur al-Islam website even had a special page dedicated to articles on the subject, entitled, “The Rawafid are Coming,” and illustrated with bloody graphics.41 Shiite websites castigated Bin Jibrin, warning him not to forget that he would have to face God on judgment day. The radical Hezbollah al-Hijaz issued a statement saying that Bin Jibrin had angred “all the sons of the Arabian Peninsula, not to mention the entire Islamic nation.
This occurs while the Islamic nation is at the peak of its feelings of pride, dignity, and joys of victory over the sons of Zion, the victory that is recorded by the hand of the mujahidin of Lebanon’s
Hezbollah.”42
The intensification of Sunni-Shiite strife in Iraq was reflected in a fatwa signed by 38 radical Sunni ulama in December 2006. Although it was addressed to the Sunnis of Iraq as a message
of support, it was strongly anti-Shiite in general, complaining about their un-Islamic practices. This fatwa had been organized by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak, a radical cleric who still occasionally appeared on Saudi TV.43 Barrak also issued his own fatwa proclaiming the infidelity (takfir) of the Shiites and their polytheistic practices, and repeated the old accusation that the sect had been founded by a Jew.44 In January 2007, Bin Jibrin let his true colors fly, and published a fatwa on his own website giving eight reasons why the Shiites should be
considered polytheists (mushrikin). He distinguished between the Shiites and “true Muslims.”45
For the Saudi Shiites who supported a model of cooperation with the regime, Shiite identification with Hezbollah proved particularly problematic. Saudi Arabia is a Sunni religious state.
To identify with a Shiite movement, and, by implication, the Shiite stateof Iran, ran counter to the normative Saudi ethos. As time wore on and Shiite regional ascendancy became more apparent, the Saudi Shaykh Salman al-Awda sounded the alarm about Sunni conversion to Shiism (tashayyu), expressing his fear that Shiite victories in Lebanon and Iraq might draw Sunnis away.46 Many Saudi newspapers carried warnings from Wahhabi clerics against conversion to Shiism.47 King Abdallah him self addressed this issue in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyasa in late January.
The interviewer referred to a “campaign” of Shiite proselytism and asked to know what Saudi Arabia’s position on the issue was as the source of religious authority (marja) for Sunni Muslims and protector of the law of God and His creed. Abdallah, accepting the premise of the question regarding the campaign and Saudi Arabia’s role as protector of the Sunnis, said that the Saudi leadership was following the issue, but that the Shiite campaign would fail because Sunnis held fast to their beliefs.48 The presentation of Saudi Arabia as the source of religious authority for Sunni Muslims drew a
stark distinction between Shiite Iran and Sunni Wahhabi Saudi Arabia.
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