2007 – A Year of Decision in the Middle East that will affect the World – PART 5
January 10, 2007
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
CAN THE IAF DESTROY IRAN’S NUCLEAR SITES?
This is the fifth in a series of BLOGS on the year 2007 as a Year of Decision for Israel on the Iranian Nuclear Threat. The major question of the series is simply “What is Israel going to do about it?” How Israel handles this problem, has, is, and will continue to, cause the world to hold its breath. As you know by now, my guesstimate for the time of an attack against Israel will occur on some day during the time period 2008 to 2012. I suspect the events of 2007 may well determine how early or late it will occur in this time frame.
Does the IAF have the capability of destroying the many sites that make up Iran’s nuclear complex? – Number 5 in this series deals with some of the ramifications of that question.
Yaakov Katz, an excellent journalist, has an outstanding analysis of the pros and cons Israel faces in “to launch or not to launch,” from which I will draw in this and future BLOGS. It appears in the Jerusalem Post, and is titled “Decision Time.”
Decision Time
BY YAAKOV KATZ, THE JERUSALEM POST
Begin Excerpt 5 from Jerusalem Post
ISRAELI MILITARY CAPABILITY
While diplomatic efforts have taken center stage over the past year, military commanders have been drawing up the plans that could be used if all else fails. Senior security officials predict that 2007 will be the crucial year of decision on whether to launch a strike.
But is Israel even capable of such an attack?
A former IAF head claims that Israel has the ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear program or at least set it back by several years. The time gained, he says, could be used to work to topple the Islamic regime or follow up the strike with tough sanctions that would make Iran abandon its atomic plans.
Not everyone agrees.
One former IAF brigadier-general says he is not certain the air force is capable of dealing Iran
the powerful blow necessary to delay the program. “If we send the air force there, we run the risk of losing a third of our fleet,” he says. “And if we return without fulfilling the mission, then what will we have achieved?”
With Iraq, Israel has certainly proven its willpower.
In 1981, a formation of eight F-16 fighter jets flew just over 2,000 kilometers and destroyed the Osirak reactor outside Baghdad. According to the former head of the IAF, prime minister Menachem Begin decided – together with the OC Air Force Maj.-Gen. David Ivry – that the moment the Iraqis put fuel into the reactor, Operation Opera would be given the green light.
“The government needs to decide what its red line is,” he says. “Once that line is crossed then we need to attack.”
Israel seems to be preparing for the possibility that it will have to “go it alone” against Iran. A recent escalation in rhetoric seems to indicate that the country is getting ready for such an option.
According to the intelligence assessment for 2007, the defense establishment does not foresee the US launching a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear installations. The Democratic takeover of the US Congress and the Baker-Hamilton report, which calls for dialogue with Iran, led to the prediction that President George W. Bush will not order a military strike.
“The entire movement in the US is toward dialogue, not military action,” says one high-ranking intelligence official. “Countries are beginning to come to terms with the fact that there will be a nuclear Iran.”
ISRAEL IS NOT one of those countries.
Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh told The Jerusalem Post in November that sanctions were unlikely to work and that Israel must be prepared to thwart Teheran’s drive for nuclear capability “at all costs,” even in a preemptive strike. Since then other leaders have added their voices, including Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres who recently declared: “Iran too can be destroyed.”
Military Intelligence, however, admits it works under the assumption that it is not aware of all Iran’s nuclear sites. According to senior officers, the assumption is that Iran has built secret installations for its covert military program.
There are additional complications. While Osirak was a distant target that required expert pilots who could maneuver at low altitude, it was only one facility and was above ground.
A number of Iran’s nuclear facilities are underground and are heavily fortified, some with steel reinforcements and others with layers of concrete.
According to a senior government official involved in security and strategic affairs, the military would need precise intelligence on every facility to be able to choose the most effective weapon.
“We would need to know all of the specifications,” he says. “Whether the bunker is fortified by steel or concrete and even how thick it is.”
So how would it be done? According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the IAF can generate more than 300 long-range attack and fighter-cover sorties daily, supported by refueling tankers, electronic warfare, electronic intelligence and airborne warning and control systems planes, while maintaining a strong reserve against intervention by the Arab states.
Each attack sortie could include the use of Popeye or GBU-15 standoff missiles, laser or electro-optical guided bombs, and Joint Direct Attack Munition missiles with further protection provided by Samson decoys. Follow ing the war
in Lebanon, the IAF has ordered large numbers of JDAMs to refill stocks used against Hizbullah.
Israel is also buying 500 US BLU-109 “bunker buster” bombs that are reported to be capable of penetrating the concrete protection around some of Iran’s underground facilities, like the enrichment center at Natanz, according to the Daily Telegraph.
Israeli fighter jets have carried out other long-range missions in the past including the 1985 2,060-km strike on the Palestine Liberation Organization’s headquarters in Tunis in response to the murder of three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus.
Today, the IAF’s 25 F-15Is (called “Ra’am” or “Thunder” in Hebrew) based in the Negev, with a combat range of close to 4,400 kilometers, are capable of striking Iran in a nonstop operation like that against Osirak.
By the end of the year, the IAF will also finish receiving the remainder of the 102 F-16Is (“Sufa” or “Storm” in Hebrew) it procured in the late 1990s. These too are capable of long-range missions, with a combat radius of closer to 2,200 km., extended by another 1,000 km. if conformal fuel tanks are used.
The combat radius on these aircraft could be increased by utilizing the IAF’s fleet of B-707 air- to-air refueling tankers that could nurse attack planes as they make the flight
to Iran and back.
According to foreign media, Israel can also utilize its Jericho 2 missiles, which according to Globalsecurity.org have a range of 1,500 km. and a payload of 1,000 kilograms. The Jericho 2, according to foreign reports, has enhanced accuracy and puts almost every Arab capital, including Teheran, within striking distance.
The navy also has three German-made Dolphin-class submarines which, according to foreign reports, may carry surface-to-surface Harpoon missiles capable of delivering a 227-kg. warhead to a range of 130 km. Some foreign reports suggest the subs might be capable of carrying nuclear-armed Popeye Turbo cruise missiles, which would enable second-strike capabilities.
Another issue of extreme importance is the route the air force would choose. The quickest and most convenient would be over Jordan and Iraq, but according to Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shlomo Brom of the Jaffee Center, it would be best to fly the longer route over the Indian Ocean with minimal penetration of other states’ air space. Asking Jordan or the US for permission prior to
the flights could jeopardize the entire mission.
“Flying through Jordan without the explicit or implicit permission of the Jordanians would hurt relations with a friendly Arab state,” Brom wrote in a recent article in the book Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran. “Flying over Iraq without coordination with the United States would lead to a clash with US interceptors.”
In addition to the underground reinforcement at certain nuclear sites, the Iranians have also beefed up their air defenses in preparation for a possible air strike.
But the strong air defenses do not protect fixed Iranian targets against standoff precision-guided weapons fired from out of range of the anti-aircraft missiles.
According to a high-ranking IAF officer, “The Iranian air force is not a threat to the IAF. None of our neighbors pose an aerial threat that the air force would not be able to deal with.”
The Iranian Air Force is comprised of MiG-29 squadrons and other planes, some dating back 30 years. Air defense systems, which are currently heavily deployed near the various nuclear sites, feature Russian SA-2, SA-5, SA-6 and shoulder-launched SA-7 missiles, according to the Military Balance prepared by the Jaffee Center. The Iranians also have aged US-made Hawk missiles and have been seeking to purchase the sophisticated S-300P from Russia.
“Israel can do it,” the former head of the Air Force says. “All you have to do is pick a number of essential targets and destroy them.
This way you postpone the process and wait to see what happens.”
End Excerpt 5 from Jerusalem Post
FAIR USE NOTICE: This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.
For more detailed information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. You may use material originated by this site. However, if you wish to use any quoted copyrighted material from this site, which did not originate at this site, for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use’, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner from which we extracted it.