Bring world’s wandering terrorists into its existing National Terror Cells
Where the Cells are also engaged in recruiting Natives in the Nations
The Number Of the Terrorist Cells Within US and Its Allies Is Growing
They will See and feel their actions within when Islam Attacks Israel
November 27, 2011
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
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Begin Excerpt 1 from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL via World News
EUROPE NEWS
NOVEMBER 24. 2011, 7:27 A.M. ET
Migration to U.K. Hits Record
BY ALISTAIR MACDONALD
Migration into Britain last year hit its highest rate since record-keeping began in 1964, dealing a blow to Prime Minister David Cameron, who won power promising to curb an unprecedented wave of immigration into the U.K.
Migration—defined as the difference between the total number of people who enter and exit the country to live—hit 252,000 in 2010.
Begin Excerpt 2 from the Center for Immigration Studies
Europe’s Miyahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism
By Robert S, Leiken
April 2006
Background and Report
In the late 1990s the European public began to grow restive in the face of perceived government failure even to identify the sources of “insecurity” (a politically correct French code word for vandalism, delinquency, and violent assaults often linked to immigrant enclaves), still less to reduce it, and policies that failed either to regulate the arrival of immigrants or to integrate their new neighbors. In the 21st century, extremism and terrorism emanating from the same population has converted discontent into electoral rebellion and crisis, as in the foulard (headscarf) controversy in France, the asylum crisis in Great Britain, and the reaction to Van Gogh’ s hideou
s assassination. Pro-immigration lobbies and scholars often treat the connection of Islamist terrorism and international immigration with condescension or invective.
But this defensive stance will not withstand what Solzhenitsyn called “the pitiless crowbar of events.”27
Trends of Terrorism
Like international migration, global terrorism presented a rising trajectory in the period 1970-2003. To capture the tendencies of global terrorism we analyzed the RAND-MIPT database on terrorism, a convenient tool for quantitative and analytical research.28 We focused on the targets listed by RAND that could be indisputably classified as civilian.29 We looked at the evolution of casualties from terrorist attacks on civilians from 1968 to 2003 and found a clear trend of targeting the civilians in larger numbers. To quantify this trend more precisely we arrived at a terrorist casualty ratio per year—total victims (injured+killed) / total incidents. We then calculated the averages of these ratios for the 1970s (1970-1979), 1980s (1980-1989), the 1990s (1990-1999) and for 2000-2003. We found an average casualty per incident rate of 4.47 for the 1970s, 4.87 for the 1980s, 12.29 for the 1990s, 14.49 for the period 2000-2003.
The sharp rise in casualties corresponds to the emergence of Islamist terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980’s the predominant terrorist groups responsible for the most casualties were secular (largely nationalist, anarchist, or fascist). In the 1990’s those groups were supplanted by religious, typically Islamist, groups, and we witnessed a corresponding rise in both casualties per incident as well as lethality. We calculated and compared the casualty rates for the two kinds of groups between 1968 and 2003. We found 3.27 casualties per incident for the secular nationalist groups and 27.05 casualties per incident for the religious groups. By the same token, the lethality ratio (total dead / incidents) is 0.92 for the secular groups and 38.4 for the religious groups.30 (See Appendix,)
Thus in the very period that mass immigration to
the West rose, there was a parallel rise in mass terrorism. It would be shallow and misleading to link these two trends in a sensational way.
As we indicated from the outset if mass immigration and mass terrorism may be said to stem from similar causes (globalization, “imperialism,” modernization et al.), they have different social sources and objectives. Our point here is that these two phenomena converge in Western Europe.
This convergence poses the least appreciated threat to Western security today.
U.S. and European Muslims
If it is to strike the United States, al Qaeda, as a 9-11 Commission Staff Report phrased it, has “a travel problem:” how to transport mujahideen from their breeding grounds to their target areas.31 To understand why this task is both necessary and feasible, we must glance at the Muslim communities in the United States and Western Europe.
So far those American Muslims receptive to jihad have expressed it by supporting Palestinian Islamist groups, in funding terrorism, not committing it.
To strike at the United States, it appears that al Qaeda generally must rely on infiltration as opposed to domestic “sleeper cells” and recruitment, though there are rare examples of the latter, such as the case of Iyman Faris, the Ohio trucker-and naturalized U.S. citizen, who attempted to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge. (In the light of the Islamization of major American Islamic groups and mosques, one cannot discount the emergence of American sleeper cells in the future. For a discussion of this, see Bearers, chapter 4).
As opposed to their American counterparts who enter a settler country, “a country of immigration,” in Western Europe immigration is generally a recent phenomenon occurring in less expansive geographical units. Partly for that reason, immigration in many European countries has become a national issue in a way and to a degree that has yet to happen in the United States. But what most sharply distinguishes European from American immigrants is their provenance, in the former most often
from Muslim countries. Moreover, European Muslim immigrants tend to be indigent and to live in enclaves unlike their American counterparts. European Muslims typically live in banlieues (outer “inner cities”). American Muslims tend to be educated professional or business people who are far more affluent than their European equivalents.32
Western censuses do not inquire into faith, making for wide discrepancies in estimates of Muslim immigrant populations, with government and journalistic estimates tending to be larger than those of scholars.
Either set of calculations may be influenced by political considerations.
Nevertheless we can make some rough estimates of the numbers of Muslims residing in those countries, with the predominant source country in parenthesis. Demographers believe that the U.S. Muslim population does not exceed three million, less than 2 percent of the population.33 In France (Algerian, Moroccan) that population reaches 7 to 10 percent (news reports suggest five to seven million Muslims reside in France) with government figures on the higher scale and academics coming in as low as 3.7 million.34 The Netherlands Muslim (Moroccan) population reaches one million or 6.2 percent of the country’s 16 million people.
Germany’s Muslim population (Turkish) is about 3.7 percent (approximately three million) and Belgium’s 3.7 percent.35 The U.K number is 2.7 percent or about two million, but radical fundamentalism prevails in many British mosques and communities.36 Thus France and the Netherlands have the largest Muslim populations as a percent of their population, followed by Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Britain at around 3 percent.
Norway, Finland, and Ireland have among the smallest Muslim populations in Western Europe, under one percent.
Muslims form the majority of immigrants in most Western European countries, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany or, as in the U.K., the largest single component. Moreover, while America’s Muslims are diffused geographically and are fragmented ethnically, European Muslims tend to congregate in enclaves or even ghettoes. We have not been able to go beyond estimates as to the numbers of immigrants from specific countries (e.g. Tunisians in Italy or Moroccans in the Netherlands). Our matrix of 373 terrorists found more French nationals than nationals of Pakistan and Yemen combined. Likewise we found more Britons than Sudanese, Yemenis, Emiratis, Lebanese, or Libyans. These results highlight the Western European Muslim immigrant component of international terrorism.
Begin Excerpt 3 from the World Savvy Monitor Human Migration
Issue 7, January 2009
Migration, Security, and Counterterrorism
The impact of immigration on homeland security in the “Age of Terror,” particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, is a topic of much debate.
Some domestic terrorism has been linked to migrants or foreign nationals in countries all over the world for some time, an obvious example being IRA attacks in England during the 1980s.
These events are differentiated from acts of war because the targets are civilians, and the perpetrators’ goal is to undermine civilian morale in order to alter some aspect of the host country’s policies. Domestic terrorists have often been migrants, or naturalized or second generation immigrant citizens of their target countries.
The rise of Islamic jihad against Western targets, typically wealthy, democratic countries of destination for immigrants, has caused an attitudinal shift in these countries.
The US, UK and France have set about not only strengthening their borders, but also monitoring Muslim immigrant populations closely.
Counterterrorism and homeland security concerns have come to heavily impact immigration policy. From no-fly lists to rigorous background checks to electronic surveillance, countries that were already beginning to restrict immigration through formal and procedural channels became even less welcoming. As we saw in the Restrictions section, these moves unleashed robust domestic debates at home and worldwide about civil liberties and human rights.
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