Israel will Use Sinai Fence When She Is Driven into the Negev Wilderness
And part of the remainder of fence system still standing South of Hebron
Will be a Part of their surrounded Truce position in the Negev Wilderness
Land Beersheba South to Eilat between Jordan & Sinai for 3 & 1/2 Years
Near the End of Which time Antichrist shall ask Old World Nations to Join
Him In The Final Battle Of Armageddon to Annihilate The Nation of Israel
November 16, 2011
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
I AM OF THE OPINION THE MOST LIKELY TIME FOR A MAJOR WAR TO BEGIN IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN ISLAM AND ISRAEL LIES AT A POINT IN TIME BETWEEN 2013 AND 2015.
AN ISLAMIC COUNTERATTACK WILL BE LAUNCHED AGAINST ISRAEL FEOM THE NORTH. ISLAMIC NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND ORGANIZED PREPARATION WILL SURPRISE ISRAEL, AND THEY WILL BE PUSHED SOUTH TO BEERSHEBA, WHERE THEY WILL HOLD, AND A TRUCE WILL BE DECLARED, AS HAS BEEN DONE MANY TIMES IN THE PAST.
Zechariah 13:8 – And it shall come to pass, that in all the land, saith the Lord, two parts therein shall be cut off and die; but the third shall be LEFT THEREIN.
Some 2/3 (4 Million) Jews will perish, and some 1/3 (2 Million) will be “left therein” the borders of Israel in the Negev Wilderness, which is the southe
rn part of Israel.
Revelation 12:6 – And the woman fled into the wilderness, where she hath a place prepared of God, that they should feed her there a thousand two hundred and threescore days.
God will see that the 2 Million remnant woman Israel is protected and provided for during the time of the truce, which will be some1260 prophetic days in the 3 & ½ Prophetic Years she will be in the Negev. The 144,000 saved and sealed Israelites will be part of the Remnant.
The Remnant will be maintained by God throughout their time in the Negev. But near the end of their stay in the Negev, the Lord will fight directly tectonically and meteorologically against the Antichrist whose troops have trodden under foot his Holy City Jerusalem for almost 3 and ½ Years.
Revelation 16:10-19 – And the fifth angel poured out his vial upon the seat of the beast; and his kingdom was full of darkness; and they gnawed their tongues for pain, [11] And blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds.
[12] And the sixth angel poured out his vial upon the great river Euphrates; and the water thereof was dried up, that the way of the kings of the east might be prepared. [13] And I saw three unclean spirits like frogs come out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the beast, and out of the mouth of the false prophet. [14] For they are the spirits of devils, working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty. [15] Behold, I come as a thief. Blessed is he that watcheth, and keepeth his garments, lest he walk naked, and they see his shame. [16] And he gathered them together into a place called in the Hebrew tongue Armageddon. [17] And the seventh angel poured out his vial into the air; and there came a great voice out of the temple of heaven, from the throne, saying, It is done. [18] And there were voices, and thunders, and lightnings; and there was a great earthquake, such as was not since men were upon the earth, so mighty an earthquake, and so great. [19] And the great city was divided into three parts, and the cities of the nations fell: and great Babylon came in remembrance before God, to give unto her the cup of the wine of the fierceness of his wrath.
Zechariah 14:1-4 – Behold, the day of the Lord cometh, and thy spoil shall be divided in the midst of thee. [2] For I will gather all nations against Jerusalem to battle; and the city shall be taken, and the houses rifled, and the women ravished; and half of the city shall go forth into captivity, and the residue of the people shall not be cut off from the city. [3] Then shall the Lord go forth, and fight against those nations, as when he fought in the day of battle.
[4] And his feet shall stand in that day upon the mount of Olives, which is before Jerusalem on the east, and the mount of Olives shall cleave in the midst thereof toward the east and toward the west, and there shall be a very great valley; and half of the mountain shall remove toward the north, and half of it toward the south. [5] And ye shall flee to the valley of the mountains; for the valley of the mountains shall reach unto Azal: yea, ye shall flee, like as ye fled from before the earthquake in the days of Uzziah king of Judah: and the Lord my God shall come, and all the saints with thee
Zechariah 13:9 – And I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried: they shall call on my name, and I will hear them: I will say, It is my people: and they shall say, The Lord is my God.
Zechariah 14:8,9 – And it shall be in that day, that living waters shall go out from Jerusalem; half of them toward the former sea, and half of them toward the hinder sea: in summer and in winter shall it be. [9] And the Lord shall be king over all the earth: in that day shall there be one Lord, and his name one.
Begin Excerpt 1 from Haaretz
On Israel-Egypt border, best defense is a good fence
Massive construction is being rushed along Israel’s border with Egypt, where a monster of a fence is being built.
No less than the West Bank separation fence, this project is reshaping Israel’s political and security situation.
By Amos Harel
Published 02:21 13.11.11
The fence being built in the south is five meters high – twice the height of the separation fence in the territories and of the fences on Israel’s other borders – and is changing the reality along the border. This year it consumed some 15 percent of the country’s annual steel consumption
By the end of next January,
the first 100 kilometers of the fence will be in place. Barring unexpected delays, the whole project (apart from a 13-kilometer enclave near Eilat ) will be completed by the end of next year.
The built portion of the fence earlier this month. Sixty-five kilometers of the 240-kilometer-long fence have been completed. The fence is almost immune to attack
The southern fence doesn’t have the feel of a rushed project quickly built under duress, like the West Bank separation fence, which was built in the wake of a number of devastating attacks by Palestinians during the second intifada. But it, too, is being pushed along with surprising speed by political winds and security needs.
The declarations by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009, about the need to build a fence that would prevent the entry of infiltrators from Sinai, took on heightened urgency with the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt early this year.
The infiltration of a terrorist squad from Sinai on August 18, which resulted in eight Israeli deaths along Highway 12, which runs along the border, was
the final act that propelled the words into deeds. Dozens of bulldozers are now at work at some 50 sites along the border.
The fence will stretch along 240 kilometers, from the Kerem Shalom passage in the north to Eilat in the south.
The fence was originally planned for socioeconomic purposes: to block the infiltration of refugees and asylum seekers from Africa, who, it was claimed, were also a security risk. L ast ye
ar, about 13,500 people entered Israel across the border with Egypt, and a similar number is expected to enter this year.
But the priorities change. As the terrorist attack in August made clear, the breaches also serve terrorists. If they are not sealed, Eilat will face a serious wave of attacks and the entire Negev will be exploited for arms smuggling and for the infiltration of militants – whose destination will be the center of Israel and the West Bank – from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.
Brig. Gen. Eran Ophir, 54, a logistics officer by training, spent his entire army career in the technological and logistics directorate. He is known as a top-notch go-getter, and the Israel Defense Forces recruited him on several occasions for major projects, such as the disengagement from Gaza.
He started to handle fence projects after the chief of staff at the time, Dan Halutz, introduced structural changes which led to the abolition of the logistics unit he headed. (The unit was restored after the Second Lebanon War.
)
Ophir was appointed to head “Derech Acheret” (Another Way ), a joint IDF-Defense Ministry directorate which is building the separation fence between Israel and the West Bank.
But the dwindling financial investment in that project, compounded by legal problems, led to its slowdown and near cessation. Ophir was thereupon appointed to manage other infrastructure projects as well. On the southern border, Ophir is free to work at his own pace – without the High Court of Justice and without B’Tselem.
The fence is being built meticulously on the borderline, in some cases even east of it, in Israeli territory. It will not annex private land, because there are no private landholdings near the border.
The project is being coordinated in part with environmental organizations, despite the large-scale damage to the desert terrain. Unlike the separation fence, the fence in the south is not attracting the attention of the international court in The Hague or the rage of left-wing activists like those who demonstrate every week at Bil’in in the West Bank.
Seen up close, the barrier looks almost impassable, at least to a casual visitor. Its metal is almost immune to attack. It is hard to climb it and it looks as though it will be difficult to tunnel under it. The diagonal rods in the top part of the fence pose serious deterrents to the possibility of climbing over it.
“It is indeed a monster,” says the deputy director general of the Defense Ministry, Brig. Gen. (res. ) Bezalel Treiber. “Seen from the Egyptian side, the fence overall is quite frightening.”
Still, he adds, there is no such thing as an impassable obstacle. “I imagine that if Sayeret Matkal were given enough time to prepare, it would find a way to get across,” he says, referring to the elite Israeli commando unit. “It always depends on the effort that is put in. But this fence is a lot harder than in other places in Israel and also tougher than the fence on the United States-Mexico border. It should be enough against infiltrators and terrorists, even if over time they will look for weak points that might be passable. We will have to install more detection methods at those points.”
Treiber spent much of his army service in Sinai. “Even so, it took time for me to internalize the fact that this is something else. It was only after I drove twice along the entire route that I grasped the scale of the thing,” he says.
Far from people, but far from troops
The heart of the problem with defending the Israeli Egyptian border is the vast areas, which cannot be covered by a dense deployment of forces. “It is impossible to count on the company commander reaching an infiltration point within minutes of getting the alarm, as can be done in the Lebanon sector. It could take him as much as a quarter of an hour,” says Treiber.
The solution is not a fence which just alerts the sector just by being touched, but a fence that is harder to cross, which is backed up by radar and observation means which are supposed to cover the strip west of the border.
Its relative advantage over the fence in the north or the Green Line fence lies in its distance from population centers. The force deployment along the northern fence was worked out on the basis of the assumption (which gloomy experience proved correct ) that a terrorist who crosses it will be able to get to the homes in the communities of Avivim or Zarit, along the Lebanon border, within minutes.
Ahead of the disengagement from Gaza, the Sharon government allotted the Defense Authorities millions of NIS for intelligence deployment aimed at preventing infiltrations from Gaza to Sinai and from there to the Negev. The investment generated significant operational benefits, but they proved insufficient following the collapse of Egyptian control in Sinai.
A senior General Staff officer told Haaretz, “The intelligence cover is a point of weakness which is always a subject for constant improvement in the area. In the absence of sufficient intelligence for the time being, the operative logic does not rely only on intelligence. The conception is, among other things, that radar alerts us to movement and the observation means are directed there and locate it.”
The intelligence gap is due to the character of the organizations that are now active in Sinai. They are not more Palestinian squads but Bedouin groups, some of which get funding and training from organizations in the Gaza Strip, while others have ties to global Jihad organizations, which take their inspiration from ideas propounded by Osama bin Laden.
The high-level planning and operational skills displayed by the assailants in the August attack took the IDF by surprise.
The attack was planned carefully, using an effective division into secondary squads which were assigned specific tasks. The attack resembled a pitched battle, far larger and more sophisticated than anything attempted by the Palestinians in the eleven years that have passed since the eruption of the second intifada.
There is no comparison between the prior effort this kind of attack requires and the dispatch of another brainwashed suicide bomber from a Nablus mosque to blow up a bus in Tel Aviv. Only the abduction of the reserve soldiers by Hezbollah, an event which triggered the Lebanon war of 2006, is comparable to the scale of the August assault.
The attack obliged not only a speedup in the building of the fence, but also a significant reinforcement of the forces along this poorly-guarded border. The number of forces was almost doubled, and a regular brigade was headquartered in the southern sector; it is currently being manned by the Nahal paramilitary brigade.
The work being done by Treiber and Ophir is being overseen by the deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, who conducts a weekly meeting to monitor the project’s progress, and by the GOC Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Tal Russo, who is setting the order of priorities for sealing the various sectors.
“After the August incident,” the senior General Staff source says, “we realized that we could not take another similar attack. Eilat would not be able to cope. The effort is now focused on stabilizing the sector, until the fence is complete.”
In a tour of the fence last Tuesday, we saw two large Intelligence Corps observation balloons hovering over the southern part of the border. There were very few civilian vehicles on Highway 12, which abuts the border, where the attack occurred. Travel on the road is restricted, and in part is conditional on a close army escort.
The new fence is already in place at the point where the terrorists crossed the border, but not far from there, the old fence, an outdated barbed-wire fixture, is still in place.
“A child can cross it in half a minute,” Treiber says.
Ophir travels the route between the work crews.
“Look what’s been done here in less than a year,” he says proudly. “When there is no interference, I can fly.”
Seal everything, or nothing at all
As of our tour, work on 65 kilometers of the 240 had been completed. The fence is going up at a rate of 800 meters a day.
The initial government decision authorized the building of a fence along 83 kilometers, but afterward, Treiber notes, “It turned out that without sealing the whole sector you seal nothing.”
The work, for which NIS 1.35 billion has been budgeted (half from the defense budget and half made available by the Finance Ministry ), is expected to be concluded by the end of next year. This does not include the closure of 13 kilometers in the Eilat enclave, which is tough, steep terrain and will require an additional NIS 200 million at least to build a fence there.
Treiber promises “zero deviations from the timetable and the budget.”
The majority of the work on the project was commissioned via public tenders. However, in the case of the radar, the Defense Ministry decided to choose an off-the-shelf product, on the grounds that embarking on operational experiments would delay the completion of the project by two years. Even so, some security firms have voiced complaints about the project’s management.
No less than the West Bank separation fence, the Egyptian border fence is reshaping Israel’s political and security situation. The project, which was engendered by an urgent problem, will have far-reaching implications, ranging from the personal security of Eilat’s residents and of the many tourists who visit the resort town, to Israel’s future relations with Egypt.
The effects of investment in fencing can be seen best along the border with Syria in the Golan Heights. After Palestinian and Syrian demonstrators managed to infiltrate the border during Nakba Day rioting, Ophir’s directorate was called in to repair the fence on the Golan Heights and the surrounding infrastructure, at a cost of some NIS 50 million.
Since then, Treiber says, “demonstrators have come from Syria, seen that the fence is impassable, and gone back.”
Before the events of May and June, the Golan Heights occupied a very low slot in the order of infrastructure priorities. Prior investment in defending the border might have allowed Israel to escape the damage caused by that imbroglio.
Begin Excerpt 2 from Jerusalem Post via Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs/Daily Alert
November 14, 2011
The Empirical Case for Defensible Borders
Uri Resnick (Jerusalem Post)
Former Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was one of the clearest and most authoritative exponents of the case for Israel’s need for defensible borders. In an October 1976 article in Foreign Affairs, Allon noted that whereas Israel’s rivals seek to “isolate, strangle and erase Israel from the world’s map,” Israel’s strategic aims have been focused on its “imperative to survive.” Thus, even if peace agreements are reached, border and security arrangements must ensure Israel’s ability to defend itself in the event that such agreements are breached. As the recent upheavals in the Middle East have clearly demonstrated, this guiding principle has not lost its salience.
Israel has considerable grounds to expect security threats to persist, even subsequent to an agreement, as long as substantial Palestinian territorial claims to pre-1967 Israel persist. Territorial claims to pre-1967 Israel and tolerance for violence can be expected to persist in Palestinian society at least partly because they have been, and continue to be, deliberately cultivated by Palestinian elites, as has been extensively documented by organizations that monitor Palestinian society and media.
Access to an international border would provide Palestinian militants with the opportunity to continue – and expand – violent activities against Israel. Thus, forcing Israel into indefensible borders, such as those of June 4, 1967, is unlikely to lead to a stable regional order. Insofar as comparative, empirical research can serve as a guide, relinquishing an Israeli presence along some of the borders of a Palestinian state will severely diminish the chances of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and will probably exacerbate it.
Thus, to prevent the emergence of a heavily armed, hostile Palestinian state dominating Israel’s 15-kilometer-wide heartland – precisely as has transpired pursuant to Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and relinquishing of control over Gaza’s southern boundary – Israel will have to maintain a perimeter presence along the borders of a Palestinian state. This implies a continuing Israeli presence – along the Jordan Valley.
Maintaining an Israeli presence along the Jordan Valley is entirely compatible with the establishment of a contiguous, viable Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. The area lies exclusively to the east of the main Palestinian population centers, such that its omission would not interfere with contiguity. Excluding the Jordan Valley from the territory of a Palestinian state would also have negligible demographic implications since, according to Palestinian statistics, approximately 10,000 Palestinians reside in those parts of the Jordan Valley that were not already passed over to Palestinian civilian control under the Oslo Accords – less than .05% of the Palestinian population.
The writer serves as policy adviser to the minister of foreign affairs and lectures on game theory and territorial conflict at the IDC Herzliya.
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