ASIA HAS BURIED GREAT FOREIGN POWERS!
ASIAN MAINLAND IS BUILT FOR GUERILLA WAR
WE CAN’ T WIN LAS
TING AFGHANISTAN VICTORY!
I REMEMBER THE LAST TET OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM,
AND I AM HOPING FOR A MORE SECURE WITHDRAWAL,
IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN IN THE LAST DAYS OF PULLOUT!
October 8. 2010
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
During my tour in Vietnam I wa s
assigned to give morning briefings to 5th Special Forces operating in II Corps (Central Vietnam). Fighting guerilla warfare in Nam was a “down and dirty, root them out” war, and the U.S. personnel were t he best army in t
he world, but only God can win a lasting victory on the Asian mainland, and he will on His Second Advent for a thousand years. I listened to all the reports of the previous day’s actions at the briefings, and developed a great respect for the U.S. Special Forces as well as all the Army and Marine Forces I also briefed on some occasions. It was a terrible war and particularly so for the many remote outposts in the Vietnam Interior.
I was there when the First Cav arrived in Nam, and will never forget what one of their Bird Colonel said to me when I gave him and his contingent a briefing at my counter. He said: “We are here to kick some VC and RVN butts.” I remember the thought that passed through my mind as he left – Colonel, those butts are on their home ground, and have an underground tunnel system that runs from Saigon all the way to Hanoi.
During my time in Nam I worked with the Marines in I Corps, the Green Berets and the 101st Airborne in II Corps.
I am certain America did the right thing in Vietnam because it stopped a spread of communist doctrine in Asia. I also think we have done the right thing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I thank God for the men and women who have fought in these wars to free others from the tyrants who oppress them.
In my 78 years I have learned three things about the Middle East: (1) A foreign power cannot win and sustain a victory on the Asian mainland, (2) You cannot establish an American style Democracy in the midst of Islam, and (3) Israel as a Democracy was imported into the Middle East world, and it will be bitterly resisted by Muslims until the Lord comes to destroy the followers of Islam.
The description of the American Vietnam withdrawal is in the following Excerpt from Wikipedia:
Begin Wikipedia Excerpt
The rapidity with which the South Vietnamese position collapsed in 1975 was surprising to most American and South Vietnamese observers, and probably to the North Vietnamese and their allies as well. For instance, a memo prepared by the CIA and Army Intelligence and published on 5 March indicated that South Vietnam could hold through the current dry season—i.e. at least until 1976. These predictions proved to be grievously in error.
Even as that memo was being released, General Dung was preparing a major offensive in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, which began on 10 March and led to the capture of Buon Me Thuot. The ARVN began a disorderly and costly retreat, hoping to redeploy its forces and hold the southern part of South Vietnam, perhaps an enclave south of the 13th parallel.
Supported by artillery and armor, the North Vietnamese continued to march towards Saigon, capturing the major cities of northern South Vietnam at the end of March—Huế on the 25th and Da Nang on the 28th. Along the way, disorderly South Vietnamese retreats and the flight of refugees—there were more than 300,000 in Da Nang—damaged South Vietnamese prospects for a turnaround. After the loss of Da Nang, those prospects had already been dismissed as nonexistent by American Central Intelligence Agency officers in Vietnam, who believed nothing short of B-52 strikes against Hanoi could possibly stop the North Vietnamese.
By 8 April, the North Vietnamese Politburo, which in March had recommended caution to Dung, cabled him to demand “unremitting vigor in the attack all the way to the heart of Saigon.” On 14 April, they renamed the campaign the “Ho Chi Minh campaign,” after revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh, in the hopes of wrapping it up before his birthday on 19 May. Meanwhile, South Vietnam failed to garner any significant increase in military aid from the United States, snuffing President Nguyen Van Thieu’s hopes for renewed American support.
On 9 April PAVN forces reached Xuan Loc, the last line of defense before Saigon, where the ARVN 18th Division made a last stand and held the city through fierce fighting for several days. The PAVN finally overran Xuan Loc on 20 April and on 21 April President Thiệu resigned in a tearful televised announcement in which he denounced the United States for failing to come to the aid of the South. The North Vietnamese front line was now just 26 miles (42 km) from downtown Saigon.[ The victory at Xuan Loc, which had drawn many South Vietnamese troops away from the Mekong Delta area, opened the way for PAVN to encircle Saigon, and they soon did so, moving 100,000 troops in position around the city by 27 April. With the ARVN having many fewer defenders, the fate of the city was effectively sealed.
End Excerpt from Wikipedia
Begin Excerpt from MEMRI
Middle East Media Research Institute
Syrian Columnist: Can the United States Avoid Another Vietnam in Afghanistan?
In a recent article, Syrian columnist Muhammad Sayyed Rassas reviewed the U.S.’s situation in Afghanistan, comparing it to its situation in Iraq. He stated that since 2006, the U.S. forces in Afghanistan have been losing ground to the Taliban, and they have now reached a point where they are desperate to reach understandings with this movement at any cost. In his opinion, the Taliban’s strength in Afghanistan stems from the fact that it has the support of the majority in the country, as well as the support of the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan; conversely, in Iraq the resistance is supported only by a minority, while most Iraqis have chosen to participate in the political process rather than to fight.
Rassas adds that the Americans’ situation in Afghanistan is reminiscent of their entanglement in Vietnam, and wonders whether they will able to achieve a better outcome than they achieved in that war.
Following are excerpts from his article, which appeared on the website ahewar.org.
No Invader Has Ever Managed to Hold On to Afghanistan
“After defeating the army of the Persian king Darius in 331 BC, Alexander the Great wrote a letter to his mother in which he described the resistance of the people of [the land] now known as Afghanistan. [He wrote] that they were ‘brave and fought like the lions.’ Although [many] conquerors, such as Genghis Khan and Timur, passed through Afghanistan, none of them could consolidate their control over that region. And even the Arabs, after conquering parts of western and central Afghanistan, soon saw many [Afghans] converting back to Buddhism.
Islam never got a firm hold over the Afghans’ hearts, except when it entered [the country] peacefully.
“When the British forces attempted to expand northward from India during the Anglo-Afghan wars of 1838 and 1878, they [too] were [eventually] driven back. During the first of these wars, the British forces took control of Kabul for four years, and in the second they failed to occupy Kabul at all, though they did manage to impose their patronage [over the country], and as part of this, the Afghan king agreed to let London manage his foreign policy. After the third war, of 1919, Afghan King Amanullah Khan announced that the consequence of the 1878 war [namely the British patronage] was at an end.
“Between 1979 and 1989, Afghanistan became a graveyard for the Soviet invader and a harbinger of the fall of the Soviet empire which Stalin had built since 1945. During that period, the Soviet occupation was unstable, because the resistance forces represented the majority of the Afghan society, while the local Communists who ran the Afghan government were facing their demise…
“Many thought that the American experience in the 2001 war in Afghanistan would be different from the Soviet experience, especially considering the weak resistance offered by the Taliban government forces… [Moreover], Washington managed to muster international support (Western Europe and even Moscow), as well as regional support (New Delhi, Islamabad and Tehran), and [even] local Afghan support – [namely that of] the Northern Alliance, which included groups of Tajiks (27 percent of the population), Hazara Shi’ites (9 percent) and Uzbeks (9 percent).
“[True,] the Americans failed to secure the support of the majority of Afghans, namely the Pashtuns, the tribe of Hamid Karzai, who had lived until 2001 in the United States. However, despite the situation with the Pashtuns, the Americans’ position was stable from the day Kabul fell, on November 13, 2001, until March 2006.
During that period, it was the situation in Iraq, following the occupation of Baghdad by Washington on April 9, 2003, which seemed most volatile and unstable, and President Bush [indeed] said in early 2006 that Iraq was ‘the main issue.'”
Since 2006, the Taliban Has Taken over 80% of Afghanistan
“[But] in the spring of 2006, the Taliban turned active [and began to perpetrate] suicide attacks. In the following three years it gained control of more and more territory, eventually controlling 80 percent of Afghanistan, except for the cities (although in some provinces it demonstrated an ability to take over cities and districts for a few days, and then withdraw to the countryside and mountains).
“Iraq, [on the other hand] moved towards relative calm in 2007-2010, after the sectors supporting the resistance turned towards participation in the political process that was launched by U.S. administrator Paul Bremer through the creation of the so-called Governing Council in July 2003. Meanwhile, the ‘quartet’ (consisting of the Da’wa Party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, and the two Kurdish parties led by Barzani and Talabani), [likewise] maintained the political process by representing the majority of Iraqi society..
“In Afghanistan, this [sort of calm] could not be achieved by either the Northern Alliance or by Karzai, in the years since 2001. In fact, the opposite is true: in the 2009 elections, the Islamic Society (which is the main Tajik organization) split into two [factions led by] General Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Dr.
‘Abdallah ‘Abdallah. This was a blow to the political process in the country, especially with Karzai unable to secure considerable support among the Pashtuns, and in light of the corruption, cronyism and alleged incompetence of Karzai and those around him.
“In Iraq, the failure of the resistance stems from the fact that its supporters represent a minority in society, and [moreover, this minority has] changed its stance since 2007.
This was quite clearly reflected in the municipal elections of 2009 and in the parliamentary elections of 2010. The situation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is different, because throughout the years of U.S. occupation it has enjoyed the support of a large majority in Afghan society, namely the Pashtuns, and because [the camp of] its political opponents has disintegrated… A new factor [in its success] is that it has managed to secure very strong support within Pakistan, in the borderlands [controlled by] the Pakistani Taliban. In the past two years, [the Pakistani Taliban] has managed to corner the rulers in Islamabad, who since September 11, 2001 have chosen to follow Washington instead of their former ally, the Afghan Taliban.
“Against this backdrop, Washington has recently been making efforts – at least since the beginning of Obama’s presidency – to secure any [possible] political [agreement] with the Taliban… It is said that [various] forces in the region have been mediating [between the U.S. and the Taliban]… This reflects considerable American desperation regarding the political process in Afghanistan. [In contrast], the American negotiations with the Iraqi resistance in 2006-2007 were not serious, and afterwards Washington stopped being interested in [negotiating with the resistance at all].”
“Will the United States Avoid Repeating the Events of Saigon in Kabul?”
“In 1963, the year that witnessed the collapse of the 1954 Geneva Conference which led to the division of Vietnam, Washington faced a similar situation [in this country], with the outbreak of internal disquiet and the beginnings of armed socialist resistance against the pro-Washington administration of South Vietnam, headed by Ngo Ding Diem… Diem’s assassination in the November 12, 1963 coup did not stabilize the situation in Saigon in any way that served Washington’s [interests].
“The trouble in South Vietnam led to the [Vietnam War], with hundreds of thousands of American troops [deployed in this country] from August 1964 in an effort to prevent South Vietnam from falling to the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese supporters in Hanoi. The regime of General Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon could not provide the U.S. forces with very strong help during the war, [which ended with] the signing of the Paris [Peace Accords] in January 1973.
[This agreement] set out [the terms of] the American withdrawal and set up a joint government of Van Thieu and the Viet Cong in Saigon. During the first four months of 1975 the fighting resumed in South Vietnam, and on April 30, Van Thieu’s regime collapsed.
“Will the United States avoid repeating the events of Saigon in Kabul?”
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