DANIEL TOES ARE GENUINE FOES
IT SHALL TAKE THE POWER OF GOD
TO HOLD SUNNI & SHIITE CLAY & IRON
TOES IN ANY BOND FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD
DUE TO MANY CENTURIES OF INTENSE HATRED!
PART 2
September 12, 2010
I believe the initial 10 toes/horns the Antichrist will lead are Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq.
But many Arab countries will be overthrown as he conquers the glorious land from Dan to Beersheba and Egypt. Many will be overthrown from within by the Shiite minorities within them, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Daniel 11:40,41 – And at the time of the end shall the king of the south push at him: and the king of the north shall come against him like a whirlwind, with chariots, and with horsemen, and with many ships; and he shall enter into the countries, and shall overflow and pass over.
[41] He shall enter also into the glorious land, and many countries shall be overthrown:
The king of the south is the leader of Israel – The king of the north is the leader of the 10 toes – The glorious land is Israel – The overthrown countries are those who did not join Syria and Iran and the other 8 in the initial counterattack by the king of the north against the king of the south.
Daniel 2:41-44 – And whereas thou sawest the feet and toes, part of potters’ clay, and part of iron, the kingdom shall be divided; but there shall be in it of the strength of the iron, forasmuch as thou sawest the iron mixed with miry clay. [42] And as the toes of the feet were part of iron, and part of clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong, and partly broken. [43] And whereas thou sawest iron mixed with miry clay, they shall mingle themselves with the seed of men: but they shall not cleave one to another, even as iron is not mixed with clay. [44] And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall n ever
be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever.
Revelation 17:13,17 – These have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beast.
[17] For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan will not be among the 10 toes/horns that initially attack Israel, but they will submit to the Antichrist who leads the 10 toes, and will be a part of his Caliphate Kingdom.
Begin Quote from “Accuracy in Medias” By Paul R. Hollrah, April 11, 2007
Sunnis constitute the large majority (90 percent) of the 1.4 billion Muslims in the world. They reside primarily in Asia, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, North and East Africa, and more recently, in Western Europe and North America.
The word “Sunni” is derived from the Arabic word “Sunnah,” which means, roughly, “customary practices,” and refers to the oral history and traditions of what the Prophet Muhammad said or did during his lifetime. Sunnis regard themselves, as opposed to Shiites, as the “keepers of the true faith.”
Shiites, a distinct minority in the Muslim world, comprise some 89% of Iran’s population and 60% of the Iraqi population.
They are also a majority in Yemen, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, and there are sizeable Shiite communities along the east coast of Saudi Arabia and in Lebanon.
The Lebanese guerilla organization, Hezbollah, is Shiite.
Shiites are descended from Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima, and his son-in-law, Ali. In the years that followed Ali’s assassination in 661 A.D., leadership of Islam was claimed by the Ummayad dynasty, a Sunni sect. Nevertheless, Ali’s followers continued to claim his son, Hussein, the Third Imam, as the rightful heir. After years of bitter dispute, Hussein and his Shia followers migrated north from the Arabian Peninsula into Iraq.
In 680 A.D. Hussein found himself surrounded by Ummayad forces at Karbala, in present day Iraq. With only a handful of supporters to defend him, Hussein and 72 of his men were captured and beheaded, and their women taken captive. The battle was a defining moment in the split between Sunnis and Shiites.
Ashoura, the holiest day of the Muslim calendar, marks the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala. To this day, Shiites celebrate Ashoura by flagellating themselves with chains and slashing their bodies with swords in grief over Hussein’s death. And they’ve never forgotten who it was that beheaded him.
Sunnis and Shiites lived in relative harmony for nearly a millennium and few challenged the Sunni assumption of superiority. However, with the coming of modern communications and transportation, the drawing of national boundaries, and the establishment of major cities, Sunnis and Shiites were suddenly thrown together in close proximity and memories of old unsettled scores resurfaced.
Many of today’s most militant Islamic terror cells, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda, are members of a fundamentalist Sunni sect called Wahhabi. Since the earliest days, Wahhabis have been particularly hostile toward the Shiites.
During the early 19th century, Wahhabis attacked and destroyed Shiite shrines at Mecca, Medina, and Karbala, accusing
the Shiites of worshipping idols.
In 2004, a Kuwaiti sheikh, Hamed al-Ali, condemned Shia as “the world’s biggest display of heathens and idolatry,” while the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, once said that “the Shiites are a more pernicious enemy than the Americans, and the best strategy for… Sunnis is to ‘strike their religious, military, and other cadres.’ ” The Saudis still maintain official discrimination against Shiites and vilify them in children’s textbooks.
Then, just as I thought I was beginning to gain a little understanding of Islam I stumbled onto a discussion of “The Twelve Imams” and I noted that, between 600 and 900 A.D., ten of Shia’s first twelve Imam’s died of food poisoning. Then I heard of a Wisconsin Muslim who gouged out both of his wife’s eyes because she refused to obey him. Under Sharia law, that is his right. And then we hear of insurgents in Iraq carrying children in the back seat of explosives-packed automobiles so that they can pass through American and Iraqi checkpoints before blowing them up… children and all
Begin Excerpt from an Article in IMRI via THE HUDSON INSTITUTE
(CONTINUED FROM PART 1)
The Shiites of Saudi Arabia
by Joshua Teitelbaum
Published on Saturday, August 21, 2010
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 10
Hudson Institute, Inc. 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor Washington, DC 20005
www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiites-of-saudi-arabia
It is impossible to arrive at an exact determination of the number of Saudi Shiites. They constitute between ten and fifteen percent of the population, and about thirty-three percent
of the population in the Eastern Province.
They reside primarily in the eastern Province, where Saudi Arabia’s oil is located, with a small number living in Medina.
While the most important Shiite centers have always been Iran and Iraq, the eastern part of Arabia has always held significant Shiite populations.
Prominent historical Shiite mujtahids include Ibrahim al-Qatifi (sixteenth century), Ahmad Zayn al-Din al-Ahsai (d. 1801), and Ali al-Khunayzi (d. 1944). Until the Saudi occupation of the Eastern areas, Shiite mosques and husayniyyas (community centers) were allowed to develop.
Learning centers, known as hawzas, were allowed to exist until the mid-1940s. The connection of Saudi Shiites to Iraq is a strong one. Upon the closing of Shiite learning centers in Saudi Arabia, most religious studies students went to Iraq.7
Deep in Shiite historical memory rests their persecution by the Saudis during the18th and 19th centuries.
Expanding into Iraq in the early 19th century, Saudi warriors famously destroyed the tomb of Imam Husayn in Karbala and the tombs of the Prophet’s companions (the sahaba) in Mecca and Medina, demonstrating the extreme enmity the Saudi Wahhabis held towards the Shiites. For the Wahhabis, grave worship was the paramount act of shirk, or polytheism, a severe accusation, so its practice by the Shiites became a source of constant suffering.
The Shiites of Saudi Arabia do not represent a threat to the government or
the state. They are too small in number and too unpopular with most Saudis. But what they do, and how the Saudi government reacts to and treats them, are important for both domestic and foreign policy.
Saudi Shiites have never felt part of the state, and the government has rarely given them reason to. There are several factors influencing the government’s treatment of the Shiites: Wahhabi ideology, pressure from and response to the Wahhabi ulama, the presence of the Shiites in the sensitive oil region, and the government’s relations with Iran. These four factors have combined to influence the fate of the Shiites in Saudi Arabia throughout their history.
Modern Saudi Arabia is the result of an 18th century alliance between the Saudi family of Najd in Central Arabia and an extremist shaykh of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab.Wahhabism was a powerful and fanatic ideology that served the regime well in mobilizing the disparate tribes and casting the Shiites in the role of the quintessential “Other.” Muslims who were worse than Jews or Christians. To Sunnis in general, the Shia are known as rawafid, those who reject the first three “Rightly Guided” Caliphs in favor of Ali and the Prophet’ s Hou
se, known as Ahl al-Bayt. But for the Wahhabis, they are worse than rejectionists: they are associationists and polytheists (mushrikin) who associate people (such as Ahl al-Bayt) and objects with God. Many Shiite beliefs and practices stand in stark contradistinction to the Wahhabi creed, with its strong emphasis on tawhid, or the uncompromising unity of the Divine.
The Saudi ruling family’s legitimacy is religiously based.
The family claims to rule in the name of Islam, as interpreted by the Wahhabi clerics. The commitment of the Saudi family to Wahhabism has often been measured by the way they treated the Shiites under their control. Throughout their history, the Shiites have paid the price of the Saudi family’s quest for religious legitimacy. And religious legitimacy has been the maidservant of political aspirations and expansion.
The modern misfortunes of the Shiite community of Saudi Arabia began in 1913, with the capture of the eastern oasis of al-Hasa by the recently resurgent Saudis. They were subject to depredations and persecutions under the rulers of the governors of al-Hasa, the Jiluwi family, relatives of the Saudi royal family. Many Shiites were killed by Ibn Saud’s Ikhwan warriors when they refused to convert.8
Religiously and socially, the Shiites were marginalized by the emerging Saudi state. Sunni merchants were encouraged to settle in al-Hasa and take over traditional Shiite commercial ventures, such as the trade in dates.9 Shiite critics would later complain that the traditional interdependence between Najd, the Hijaz, and al-Hasa had been violated by the Saudis, who made all regions dependent on Najd.10
Shiite religious practices and institutions were severely curtailed. In 1927, the Wahhabi ulama published a fatwa calling upon the Shiites to “convert” to Islam. Some Shiite notables complied, while others left the country.11 The publication and distribution of religious texts was forbidden, the Shiite call to prayer was outlawed, and centers of religious studies were dismantled. Specific Shiite customs such as grave visitation (ziyarat al-qubur) were forbidden, as were the Ashura commemorations.12 The Shiites have been vilified in textbooks, and generally have been made to feel like outcasts.
Economically as well as socially, the Shiites have rarely been treated or led to believe that they are part of a common Saudi experience. For example, in the 1950s there were labor riots
in the oil fields run by Aramco, where most of the workers were Shiites. At the time, the ideologies that were gaining ground in the Arab world, such as socialism and communism, seemed attractive to many Shiites who felt discriminated against by the Saudi authorities. The Shiites felt that they were not part of the wealth that was beginning to flow to the kingdom as a result of the oil industry. 13 These riots were put down very harshly by the Saudi Arabian National Guard. In 1979 and 1980, encouraged by the success of the Iranian revolution they again rioted in demonstrations which became known as the “Intifada of the Eastern Province.” These riots were firmly crushed as well. The government did not hesitate to use helicopter gunships against the demonstrators.14
Many leaders of the Shiite community went into exile or were arrested following these protests.
Fouad Ibrahim, a Saudi Shiite scholar and former activist, relates that the main Shiite opposition body, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution (Munazzamat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya), was established by Shaykh Hasan al-Saffar, a Shiite cleric, in December 1979, following the first burst of rioting. Saffar, who participated in the uprising, was inspired by the revolutionary reading that the Iranian Ali Shariati gave to the battle of Karbala. The group functioned as a political and religious outlet for feelings of oppression and insult.15
Shaykh Saffar was echoing the thought of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he wrote:
We are genuinely part of the realm of the downtrodden [mustadafun] while the despots of Al Saud.are genuinely part of the realm of oppressors.and colonizers. The ongoing battle is now between these two realms.. Our struggle against.tyrannical rule is a cycle of a long chain of a universal revolution which will, inevitably, lead to the collapse of imperialistic superpowers and the rise of the world of the downtrodden.16
After the uprising Saffar found asylum in Iran; his organization established offices in Tehran, London and Washington, where it was concerned primarily with the publication of al-Thawra al-Islamiyya.
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