Syria Now Engaged in Plucking up First of 3 Horns!
3 of First 10 Horns Will be Plucked Up by the Roots!
3 Of Initial 10 King Horns Are Removed By 11th Horn!
3 of first 10 horns are subdued by little horn Antichrist.
Little Horn Subdues 3 of 10 First Horns on Beast’s Head.
I THINK The Initial 10 horns Are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran Nations
Saudi Arabia and ALL Arab Countries on the Arabian Peninsula
Will Join His Caliphate Soon AFTER Jerusalem Falls, BUT ‘3 OF 10
First King Horns’ He Subdues are Likely Lebanon, Sudan, & Libya!
May 26, 2010
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
PART 1
SEE SPECIAL PROPHECY UPDATE NUMBER 234A IN ARCHIVES FOR AN EXPOSITION OF THE FOLLOWING VERSES
Daniel 7:7,24,8,25,20-22,26,27 – After this I saw in the night visions, and behold a fourth beast, dreadful and terrible, and strong exceedingly; and it had great iron teeth: it devoured and brake in pieces, and stamped the residue with the feet of it: and it was diverse from all the beasts that were before it; and it had ten horns. [24] And the ten horns out of this kingdom are ten kings that shall arise: and another shall rise after them; and he shall be diverse from the first, and he shall subdue three kings. [8] I considered the horns, and, behold, there came up among them another little horn, before whom there were three of the first horns plucked up by the roots: and, behold, in this horn were eyes like the eyes of man, and a mouth speaking great things. [28] And he shall speak great words against the most High, and shall wear out the saints of the most High, and think to change times and laws: and they shall be given into his hand until a time and times and the dividing of time. 20-22 And of the ten horns that were in his head, and of the other which came up, and before whom three fell; even of that horn that had eyes, and a mouth that spake very great things, whose look was more stout than his fellows.
[21] I beheld, and the same horn made war with the saints, and prevailed against them; [22] Until the Ancient of days came, and judgment was given to the saints of the most High; and the time came that the saints possessed the kingdom. [26] But the judgment shall sit, and they shall take away his dominion, to consume and to destroy it unto the end. [27] And the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the most High, whose kingdom is an everl
asting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him.
Begin Excerpt from Middle East Media Review Institute
Syria Re-Imposes Its Patronage over Lebanon
By: H. Varulkar and N. Mozes
May 24, 2010
Inquiry and Analysis Series Report No. 611
Introduction
“…[Syria’s] political return to Lebanon is taking place slowly but surely, by means of its allies in [this country], whose numbers are growing and whose voice is becoming stronger. It is regaining its influence [over Lebanon] quietly and without military [force], placing more [emphasis] on diplomacy than it did in the past…”[1] Thus columnist Emil Khouri described the reality in Lebanon in Al-Nahar, a Lebanese daily which is close to the March 14 Forces.
Five years after a Western-Arab-Lebanese front emerged to oppose Syria’s presence in Lebanon, forcing Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to withdraw the military and security forces that had been there since 1976 and had provided the military backing for Syria’s control of Lebanon, Syria seems to be regaining its control over Lebanon. This is coming about with the backing – or at least with the acquiescence – of the very forces that five years ago led the campaign for the Syrian withdrawal.
While as of this writing Syria has not redeployed its army in Lebanon, its return to the country seems to be taking place not quite as Khouri describes – that is, not strictly by diplomatic means – but as Ghassan Sa’ud, columnist for the pro-Syrian Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar writes: “Syria is reorganizing its affairs [in Lebanon], drawing a clear line between those who are with it and those who are against it, leaving no room to maneuver.”[2]
In this endeavor, Syria is proceeding gradually, keeping an eye on the reactions in Lebanon and outside it.
Syrian officials, headed by President Assad himself, are careful to declare their support for, and recognition of, Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, citing as evidence the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the countries. However, these statements and measures appear to be mere formalities, to allay the fears of those who oppose the return of Syria’s patronage over Lebanon. In practice, Syria is setting an increasing number of conditions and demands for its opponents in Lebanon, and for various regional and international elements, with the aim of consolidating its control over the country.
For example, the pro-Syrian Al-Akhbar reported recently that Syria is demanding that Lebanese Prime Minister Sa’d Al-Hariri reaffirm agreements that the two countries signed during the period of Syria’s patronage over Lebanon,[3] thus bringing back the situation that prevailed prior to the 2005 Syrian military withdrawal.
Recently, Syria has stepped up the pace of its return to Lebanon, as its confidence increases due to greater international openness towards it during this past year, and the international community’s tacit consent to its involvement in Lebanon.[4] Other possible factors in the acceleration of its activity in Lebanon are the increasing tension between Syria and Israel, the anticipation of an imminent international decision on Iran’s nuclear dossier, and the release of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) conclusions on the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri.
This paper will review how Syria is reclaiming its patronage over Lebanon.
Reversing the Results of Lebanon’s Parliamentary Election
The March 14 Forces camp formed following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri. As the standard-bearer against the involvement of Syria and its allies – primarily Hizbullah – in Lebanon, it drew strength from two main elements: support at home in Lebanon, as manifested by the camp’s win in two parliamentary elections in a row, and support from without, headed by Saudi Arabia, France, and the U.S.
The domestic support expressed more than anything else the bitterness and disgust in Lebanon at the Syrian presence in the country, refuting Syria’s claim that its presence in Lebanon was legitimate and was strictly at the request of the Lebanese. The camp’s foreign support provided it with the backing it needed vis-à-vis Hizbullah and Syria.
Today, less than a year after its win in the parliamentary elections, the camp seems weak and fractured, while the March 8 opposition camp, which is headed by Hizbullah and close to Syria, appears to be stronger than ever. Recently, voices have even emerged among the latter camp calling for essential change in
the composition of the government, in light of the purported shift in the balance of power in Lebanon and in the region. In his column in the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to the March 8 forces, Fida ‘Itani described how these forces understand the situation in the region and in Lebanon today, and why, despite their electoral defeat, they sense that it is they who have the power: “The day the Lebanese parliamentary elections were over, with the opposition defeated, the Saudi monarch did not visit Syria; neither did Sa’d Al-Hariri in his capacity as prime minister, nor [Lebanese Druze leader] Walid Jumblatt… The day the Lebanese elections were over, the Syria-Saudi deal on the allocation [of influence] in Iraq did not reach fruition.
[Since then, things have changed;] today, the deal is in its final stages [and all these leaders have visited Syria]…”
He added that the international and regional demand that Syria deal with the purported terrorism and the control of the Palestinian weapons within and outside the refugee camps enables Syria to demand the establishment of a Lebanese government work team that will be to its liking and be loyal to it.[5]
Saudi Acquiescence to Syria’s Role in Lebanon
As Fida ‘Itani explained, some of the change in the balance of internal power in Lebanon can be attributed to the change in Saudi policy towards Syria. At the January 2009 economic summit in Kuwait, Saudi King ‘Abdallah presented a reconciliation initiative aimed at bringing the “moderate camp” and the “resistance camp” in the Arab world closer together. In the framework of this initiative, Saudi Arabia and Syria arrived at understandings on Lebanon, which in effect meant Saudi recognition of the Syrian role in Lebanon. This was shown in an article by Turki Al-Sudeiri, editor of the Saudi government daily Al-Riyadh, titled “Why Shouldn’t Lebanon Go Back to Syria?”[6] These understandings included agreement, reached prior to the Lebanese parliamentary elections, on the establishment of a national unity government in Lebanon. This in effect stripped the winning camp of the ability to establish a majority government, and took away its bargaining chips vis-à-vis the March 8 Forces, Syria’s allies.
During the discussions on the formation of the government, the March 14 Forces, headed by Sa’d Al-Hariri, were forced to comply with many March 8 Forces’ demands; also, under March 8 and Syrian pressure, they had to back down on issues that were an essential part of their platform.
This reflected the de facto victory of the March 8 Forces, even though in the elections they had come out the losers.[7]
The Syrian-Saudi understandings on Lebanon yielded additional gains for Syria:
• Friction and disputes between Sa’d Al-Hariri and his allies, and the weakening of the March 14 camp, because of the concessions that Al-Hariri was forced to make to the March 8 camp in order to assure the formation of a government.
The agreement to form a national Unity Government enabled Syria to ensure that its allies would be part of the government, without having to intervene in their favor in the Lebanese elections.
This is not the first time that the Saudis have abandoned their allies in Lebanon to Syria and Hizbullah. On May 21, 2008, the Doha agreement was signed in Qatar, under Arab sponsorship; it was aimed at ending the violent conflicts between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces that broke out May 7, 2008. The agreement expressed the March 14 Forces’ absolute submission to Hizbullah’s demands.
According to various reports, Syria is continuing to take advantage of the understandings with Saudi Arabia, for instance in order to continue pressuring Al-Hariri to comply
with its demands. As part of this, Saudi Arabia has stopped the flow of funds to Al-Hariri, and has clarified to members of his Al-Mustaqbal faction that it is serious in its reconciliation with Syria, and that there is to be no argument about it.[8]
However, it appears that these moves by Saudi Arabia are not enough for Syria, which used the Lebanese media outlets close to it to express its displeasure and to pose further demands to Saudi Arabia. Ibrahim Al-Amin, editor of the Lebanese Al-Akhbar daily, known to be close to the Syrian regime, reported on a freeze in Syrian-Saudi relations, and accused Saudi Arabia of not honoring its commitments towards Syria in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, while Syria had aided Saudi Arabia in finding a solution to the problem of the Houthis and in obtaining Sa’d Al-Hariri’s appointment as Lebanese prime minister. Al-Amin even stated that Saudi Arabia had recently played a “loathsome role” as an ally of Israel in the Arab world.[9]
Further evidence of the tension between Syria and Saudi Arabia was a column by Sarkis Na’oum in the Lebanese Al-Nahar daily, which is close to the March 14 Forces. Na’oum quoted sources close to Syria as saying that contrary to its commitments, Saudi Arabia was continuing to financially support elements in the March 14 Forces [that is, Lebanese Forces party leader Samir Geagea] who were attacking Syria and its Lebanese allies, and was not acting forcefully enough to persuade elements in the Al-Mustaqbal faction to adopt a pro-Syrian stance.
Other criticism of Saudi Arabia concerned its role in the inter-Palestinian reconciliation and in the Egypt-Syria reconciliation.[10] This criticism of Saudi Arabia shows that Syria expects a high return for its meager aid to Saudi Arabia in several matters.
Several days after the publication of this criticism, Saudi Prince ‘Abd Al’-Aziz bin Abdallah arrived in Damascus and handed Assad a letter from his father King ‘Abdallah, in an attempt to settle the dispute between the two countries. The Saudi government daily Al-Madina wrote that the visit concerned “Israel’s threats to the countries of the region” and that Syria and Saudi Arabia had agreed on the need to strengthen Arab unity.[11]
‘Abdallah Nasser Al-‘Otaibi, columnist for the Saudi London daily Al-Hayat, negated Al-Madina’s conciliatory tone, writing that Saudi Arabia had not needed Syria’s help in the war on the Houthis, or in the appointment of Sa’d Al-Hariri, who after all had been elected by democratic process.
He added that it was Syria’s connection with Iran that was the cause of the tension between Syria and the Arab countries, and that Syria was fomenting crises in order to accomplish its goals, as it had not managed to do so by political means.[12]
Endnotes:
[1] Al-Nahar (Lebanon), April 26, 2010.
[2] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), April 1, 2010.
[3] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), April 27, 2010.
[4] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No.
583, “Syria Regains Pivotal Regional, Int’l Role – The Triumph of the ‘Course of Resistance'”, January 29, 2010,
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/207/0/3940.htm.
[5] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), April 30, 2010.
[6] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2595, “‘Al-Riyadh’ Editor: ‘Why Shouldn’t Lebanon Return to Syria?’
October 14, 2009, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3705.htm
[7] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 565, “The March 14 Forces after the Formation of the New Lebanese Government: From Electoral Victory to Political Defeat and Disintegration Within Five Months,” November 22, 2009,
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/259/0/3804.htm.
[8] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), March 24, 2010.
[9] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), April 22, 2010.
[10] Al-Nahar (Lebanon) April 25, 2010.
[11] Al-Madina (Saudi Arabia), April 29, 2010.
[12] Al-Hayat (Saudi Arabia), April 29, 2010.
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