Watch Out for Syrian Military Intelligence
September 29, 2008
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
Begin Excerpt from the Jerusalem Post
‘Top Syrian officer among bomb victims’
By THE MEDIA LINE NEWS AGENCY
A car bomb carrying 200 kilograms of explosives exploded near the Palestine branch of Syrian Military Intelligence, the London-based daily Asharq Alawsat reported.
The identity of the high-ranking military officer, who was reportedly killed as a result of the explosion, had not yet been revealed.
The Palestine branch of Syrian Military Intelligence is headed by Gen.
Suleiman Dayoub, a close ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s brother-in-law, Gen. Asif Shawkat, who heads Military Intelligence and is considered one of the strongest men in the Syrian regime.
Begin Excerpt from Media Line by NIQNAQ
at least they can spell ‘a-sharq al-awsat’
September 28, 2008 by niqnaq
Syria Suffers another Blow to Regime Stability
Media Line, Sep 28 2008
A mysterious explosion near Damascus on Saturday claimed the lives of at least 17 people, including a brigadier-general, further destabilizing the Syrian regime.
A car bomb carrying 200kg of explosives exploded near the Palestine branch of Syrian Military Intelligence, the London-based daily A-Sharq Al-Awsat reported. The identity of the high-ranking military officer, who was reportedly killed as a result of the explosion, has not yet been revealed. The Palestine branch of Syrian Military Intelligence is headed by Gen. Suleiman Dayoub, a close ally of President Bashar Al-Asad’s brother-in-law, Gen. Asif Shawkat, who heads Military Intelligence and is considered one of the strongest men in the Syrian regime. No group has yet taken responsibility for the attack. Media Line’s analysts indicate this has been the second incident this year directed against a security target.
Earlier this year, Al-Asad’s top security adviser Muhammad Suleiman was assassinated in Tartous. The investigation into his murder was not made public. Saturday’s attack may be connected to Suleiman’s assassination and to a behind-the-scenes battle within the top Syrian security command.
Various unconfirmed reports over the past few months indicated that Al-Asad may have begun to worry about Shawkat’s increasing power. Syria, of course, is not revealing any such internal disputes, and is trying to place the blame on outside elements. “Unfortunately, in the years that followed
the American war on terror, terrorism has further spread. These kinds of incidents can occur anywhere and are not indicative of security breaches,” Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu’allim told reporters. Al-Mu’allim said further that Israel was among the “biggest benefactors” of the attack.
The Assassination of General Mohammed Suleiman
By INSS Friday, August 15, 2008
By Amir Kulick, INSS
On August 1, 2008, Syrian general Mohammed Suleiman was gunned down on the beach near the Syrian city of Tartous.
Only after five days of thunderous silence, Syrian officials, with typical reticence, reported that the general had indeed been assassinated and that an investigation was underway to find the culprits. Meantime, journalists and commentators have proposed different theories regarding the identity of the assassin
and the reasons for the attack. The answers to these questions have many – and contradictory – implications: for the Syrian regime, for Israel, and for other regional elements.
Who was Mohammed Suleiman and what did he do? Who wanted him dead and why
? Outside the very senior echelon, most Syrian personnel involved in internal politics – not to mention those involved in the security services and the military – tend to operate behind the scenes and not earn media coverage.
The various sources that have provided details about Suleiman since his death have differing agendas and therefore perforce have offered varying accounts. Western intelligence sources have posited that he was involved in the Syrian nuclear project; American intelligence sources have tied Suleiman to transfers of chemical weapons from Iraq to Syria in 2003 on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq; the Israeli media has pointed to his involvement in arms transfers to Hizbollah; Lebanese sources have claimed that Suleiman was a key witness in the investigation of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri; and Syrian opposition sources have explained that the Syrian general was one of the people closest to Asad and was involved in both security matters and party politics. Therefore, the latter have postulated that “something is rotten” at the very top in Syria. Various commentators have even suggested the conspiracy theory, i.e., that the assassination was a Hizbollah initiative to settle open accounts since the assassination of Imad Mughniyah in Damascus in February.
It is possible to identify Suleiman’s hand in three primary areas: internal Syrian issues connected to the regime and the party; sensitive military issues; and Lebanon-related issues, through which he was apparently connected both to Hizbollah and to others in the Lebanese political arena. Therefore, there may be different elements wanting to see Suleiman dead, and
the implications of his assassination vary according to the respective theories.
The internal Syrian arena is the most intricate possibility.
The fact th at Suleiman was viewed as one of the people closest to Asad suggests a number of individuals, especially
at the very top of the Syrian leadership, who might have benefited from the assassination, part of a power struggle at the highest levels of the regime. Since 2000, Bashar al-Asad’s firm entrenchment of his rule has been accompanied by the removal of various senior officials – deposing them from positions of power and replacing them with people from his inner circle. The most prominent examples of this were the 2004 retirement of Syrian defense minister Mustafa Talas and a year later, the dramatic escape of Vice President Abd-al-Khalim Khaddam to France. After Mughniyah’s assassination, various reports were published regarding tensions between Asif Shawkat, the head of military intelligence, and Bashar al-Asad.
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