Lebanon toe is already in place as one of Ten
Soon she will be joined by a large Turkey Hen
As In-country forces of Islam will remove Mask
Then Turkey will become as it was in the Past!
So to her NATO allies her friendship won’t Last
July 31, 2008
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
Begin Excerpt from MERIA Journal
Volume 1, Number 4, December 1997
Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey
By Ely Karmon
December 1997
The “Hezbollah Muslims” appeared for the first time publicly in 1984 and, as the original Hezbollah, proclaimed support for the Iranian revolution and the defense not of nations or sects, but of “Allah’s way.”
According to Imset, Kalim Siddiqui, a Pakistani active at the Muslim Institute in London, had a key role in unifying Turkey`s radical Islamic Movement. Thus, the first Hezbollahi appeared in Turkey as ‘the followers of Siddiki.’ A pro-Hezbollah magazine published in November 1987 “The guidelines of the Islamic Movement,” which included the acceptance of the Islamic State as the center of religious belief, the leadership of Muslim scholars, the spread of the mentality of martyrdom and the leadership of the Islamic revolution [in Iran].
A significant development occurred in the middle of
the 1980s, with the conversion of some members of the right-wing Nationalist Movement (MHP) to Islam. The death of one of their leaders in prison in 1984 and the tortures suffered by many others convinced a group of extreme nationalist activists (called also Ulkucus)”to turn to Allah” and condemn the “darkness of nationalism.” They were heavily influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but later concluded that Sayyd Kutub’s death forced the Egyptian Islamists into a nationalist position and that true Islam could not tolerate nationalism. These militants were already professionals in the field of terrorism and street fighting and represented significant operational support for the Islamic Movement.
In southeast Turkey, Islamic radicalism emerged in poor towns and villages with a large Kurdish population (Dyarbakir, Silvan, Cizre, Kiziltepe and others), especially among the young and unemployed. They followed the teachings of local Muslim scholars or sheiks and often organized themselves around extremist Islamic publications such as Tevhid, Yeryuzu and Objektif. Their activity became more visible at the beginning of the 1990s, influenced more and more by Khomeini`s teachings, and they were identified by the local public as Hezbollah, although they considered themselves as belonging to the Islamic Movement.
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TURKISH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
There are few sources for research on the Turkish Islamic organizations, although they have their own publications and manifestoes distributed quite freely even when they threaten future victims of terrorist attacks. All the material is in Turkish and has neither been collected nor translated. The only other source consists of interviews given by anonymous leaders and activists to Turkish journalists.
In one such interviews, published in February 1993, a militant declared: “We are fighters of the Islamic Liberation Movement, the sword against Satan, blasphemy, Zionism and Imperialism. We have begun taking action only recently in Turkey and our move is based on pain, suffering and patience. We do not pursue a tribal case; our objective is to establish a state for the Muslims.” Asked whether he belonged to Hezbollah, the militant replied that the press gave that name to the organization and that they will adopt it only when the movement will be worthy of it. Meanwhile it has not reached “that level of perfection”
In speaking about the special relationship of the Movement with Iran, the same militant seemed careful not to confirm “the lies of the Turkish state” about such links. Iran is seen as an example and a guide but the instructions are “from the Koran” and not from Iran, “the land of Dar-ul Islam where blasphemy has been crushed.” The Movement needs no instructions from any country because the Koran is the program and shows the strategies and the tactics to be adopted.
A report prepared by the Turkish security authorities for the National Security Council at the beginning of 1997 outlined the objectives of the radical religious movements and stressed that their strategy consists of three stages.
The first stage is the message (teblig), and calls for an effort by the radicals to persuade the people to adopt the Islamic religion, establish an Islamic state and administration, live in accordance with Islamic rules and struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.
The second stage is the community (cemaat) and calls for the restructuring of communities in accordance with the requirements of the first stage.
The third stage is the struggle (jihad) and calls for the armed struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.
Special mention should be made of a strange organization called The Great Eastern Islamic Fighters Front (IBDA-C) active since the middle of the 1970s but more extremist and aggressive
since the beginning of the 1990s. Although an Islamic movement struggling for the constitution of an Islamic state, it uses leftist slogans in its publications and accepts ex-Marxists in its ranks.
It is also extremely antisemitic and anti-Christian in its propaganda and terrorist activity as well.
ENEMIES AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
A chronological analysis of terrorist activity of Islamic groups shows that 1990 was probably the starting point for their offensive against the Turkish secular establishment: A professor, journalist, political scientist and writer were assassinated by Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Operation (or Action), the first time this name was used.
Muammar Aksoy, a liberal political scientist, was also killed in 1990 and then for the first time the name Islamic Movement appeared.
During 1991, the year of the Gulf War, Islamic radicals seemed to enter a period of reassessment, which ended after the Madrid peace talks between Arab countries and Israel. In October an Americ
an soldier was killed and an Egyptian diplomat wounded by Islamic Jihad. The year 1992 represented the turning point in radical Islamic terrorist activity. The objectives attacked during this year being from the exiled Iranian opposition as well as Jews and Israelis.
But the government, security authorities, public and even the press became really aware of and shocked by the Islamic terrorist threat when Ugur Mumcu, one of Turkey’s top investigative reporters–who had covered the PKK, the rise of Islamic radicalism, and drug smuggling networks–was killed on 24 January 1993 by a car-bomb similar to that used in the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in March 1992 and an American computer specialist in October 1991. Both the Islamic Liberation Organization and IBDA-C took responsibility for the murder.
Several days later an attempt was made on the life of a well- known Turkish businessman and community leader of Jewish origin, Jak Kamhi, by a group of four terrorists who used automatic weapons and even a rocket-launcher. He escaped uninjured.
The same month the tortured body of an exiled Iranian dissident–Abbas Gholizadeh, a former officer and the Shah’s bodyguard–kidnapped several weeks before, was discovered by the police.
Begin Excerpt from the UK Guardian
Leading article: Collision course in Turkey
Tuesday, 29 July 2008
It is hard to think of a nation more familiar than Turkey with the tensions between East and West, between religion and nationalism, between autocracy and democracy. But those opposing forces seem to be reaching a new intensity of late.
The ruling Islamic party is at risk of being outlawed by the Constitutional Court. Another court is hearing a case against a collection of ex-army officers accused of plotting to overthrow the government by force.
But this battle for Turkey’s soul is not merely tak ing place
in court rooms. There is blood on the streets too. Two bombs exploded in Istanbul yesterday, killing 17 people. The main suspects are Kurdish separatists.
The country’s stock markets have taken a battering as investors grow nervous about the future direction of the country. A sense of crisis is building.
The irony is that the governing AK Party, despite its roots in the Islamist movement, has done a good job of contradicting the popular notion that political Islam can never settle within a secular and democratic state. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AK Party won a hefty mandate from the Turkish people in fair elections last year. It has pursued liberal economic policies and pluralist social policies.
No one disputes that the AK Party enjoys broad democratic consent.
What it lacks is the consent of the fiercely secular governing classes and the military. This is the background to the attempt by the Turkish chief prosecutor to have the AK Party banned on the grounds that it is attempting to subvert Turkey’s secular constitution.
The case might be regarded as being, in one respect, commendable. It shows that the Turkish government is subject to the rule of law. But it is also hard to avoid the conclusion that the secularists have overplayed their hand. The moves by the AK Party to lift the ban on female students wearing headscarves do not add up to a secret plot to Islamise the state.
Of course, Turkey is not the only nation to face a constitutional crisis, the threat of a coup, or a separatist insurgency.
But Turkey is globally pivotal in a number of ways – and it matters. Most obviously, it matters to the future of
the Middle East. Military incursions into the Kurdish-ruled north of Iraq threaten to plunge that country into fresh turmoil. A democratic government is far less likely than a military junta to embark on an invasion of its south-eastern neighbour. Turkey also matters to Europe. Much is rightly made of the potential prize of incorporating this fast-growing economy into the EU. And just as valuable is the leverage the possibility of entry offers to progressive politicians within the country. If Turkey is to emerge from this crisis as a stable and democratic nation, it will need all the help its friends can muster.
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