Tahadiyeh (Lull) Has Purpose
The Islamic Mugawama Doctrine
Only allows for short bursts of Peace,
Giving the power for its Implementation,
Causing enemy future casualties to Increase.
Producing the Justification for Establishing a Lull!
Islam has learned war weakness of US and Israel,
Growing number of body bags cause them to end it!
A Lull allows uninterrupted Hizbullah-Hamas Buildups!
Later lulls produce a greater number of Enemy Bodies!
July 9, 2008
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
The tahadiyeh (lull) in Israeli attacks against Hizbullah and Hamas will eventually lead to an initial defeat of the Israelis, and their flight into the Negev fortress, which was originally selected as their emergency war contingency area immediate after they became a nation in 1948.
Every nation has a war contingency plan. And, the smaller the country, the more imperative is the requirement for a detailed war contingency evacuation plan.
Israel began to formulate, plan, and build her evacuation area in the early fifties. She chose the only reasonable zone, the Negev wilderness. The Negev comprises more than one-third of the total land area of Israel, beginning just north of Beersheba, and extending all the way southward to the Gulf of Aqaba.
Why was the Negev the only reasonable area? From the historical prospective, the majority of Israel’s major conquerors have come down from the north.
Even Nebuchadnezzar, whose great empire began to the east of Israel in Babylonia, first went northwest through southern Syria to eventually attack Israel from the north.
Once Israel had signed a peace treaty with Egypt, and then with Jordan, it became evident to her political and military leaders, that they had been correct in selecting the Negev. At present, it appears very unlikely that an attack will be made against Israel from any zone other than the Syria-Lebanon area. Some minister, no one knows who, during the early part of the last century, visited Petra in Jordan, and formed an erroneous opinion, which has become very popular among many teachers of prophecy.
Whoever he was, his military training was sadly lacking, for he looked Petra over, and decided it would make a great defensive position for Israel to occupy, that is, if she ever had to flee her homeland. As a graduate of a military academy, and a retiree from the USAF-NSA,
I can assure you, Petra is the worst possible place to evacuate the survivors of a successful Arab attack against Israel. I doubt if the one who first advanced this idea actually walked all the way through Petra’s narrow northern entrance and then continued to walk out on the vast open plain to the southwest. Petra may have been a great place to defend in biblical times with the weaponry of those days, but it would be impossible to defend today.But there are other compelling reasons why Israel would never flee to Petra. There are no natural water sources in that area, and water collection by its ingenious ancient inhabitants from desert thunderstorms was never able to support a population of more than 20,000.
And food production in the soil horizons of this area could never support the evacuation of one-third of Israel’s population. It is also a certainty that the modern day occupants of Jordan would not offer to help Israel escape the Antichrist. But the belief that Israel will flee to Petra has become so popularized by many prominent ministers, it makes it very difficult to dissuade most followers of prophetic events. However, the fact that Israel has spent billions and billions of dollars turning the Negev into the most fortified, best camouflaged, zone on the earth, gives me the assurance that this is the place the woman Israel, who is described as going into the wilderness in the 12th Chapter of Revelation, will soon end up for the last three and one-half years of the tribulation period.
Begin Excerpts from Middle East Strategy at Harvard Olim Insitute
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
Learning from Hezbollah
December 22, 2007
By MESH
From Andrew Exum
What political and military strength Hezbollah enjoys is largely rooted in the some 1.4 million Lebanese Shia who comprise their constituency—and the geography of southern Lebanon that has enabled Hezbollah to mount, first, a successful guerrilla campaign against Israel and, in 2006, a successful conventional campaign. We study Hezbollah, rather, because long before the 2006 Lebanon War in which they were widely considered to have been the victors, Hezbollah has served as a model for other guerrilla groups
—groups which very well may meet the U.S. military in armed conflicts.
Hezbollah’s model of “resistance” (Arabic, muqawama) has led to a phenomenon journalist Ehud Ya’ari describes as the “Muqawama Doctrine.”
From a policy perspective, the questions we Americans must ask about Hezbollah are much different than the questions asked by Israelis, for whom Hezbollah has proven to be a direct, capable and resilient military adversary. Amir Kulick’s analysis of Hezbollah’s military posture before and after the 2006 Lebanon War is a good example of an Israeli seeking to understand an organization
that is, for Israel, both a declared and actual adversary. The things about Hezbollah that worry us, as Americans, are different and perhaps more abstract. My own concerns, which I will outline below, fall into two categories: tactical and strategic.
Tactically, Hezbollah’s performance throughout the 1990s and in the 2006 war raises three red flags for U.S. military professionals. Unlike most other Arab armies since 1948, Hezbollah demonstrates a high proficiency in the maintenance and employment of its weapons systems, Hezbollah performs well in small-unit light infantry operations, and Hezbollah uses a decentralized command structure that allows its subordinate leaders to exercise a high degree of initiative on the battlefield.
This last characteristic is the most important—and directly related to Hezbollah’s successes in small-unit combat. As Ken Pollack and others have noted, in previous wars against Arab militaries, Israeli tactical leaders grew accustomed to platoon leaders and company commanders in, say, the Egyptian Army, who could be expected to react ponderously to rapidly changing battlefield dynamics due to the degree to which they operated in highly centralized command structures—organizations in which even the smallest tactical decisions required approval from above.
This allowed Israeli tactical leaders to get inside their counterparts’ “OODA Loops.” The OODA Loop—Orient, Observe, Decide, Act—is the process, coined by John Boyd, by which military leaders make decisions. The small-unit leader with a quicker decision-making process—or smaller OODA Loop—is at a competitive advantage against his opposite number. Because Hezbollah small-unit leaders, with freedom to make decisions quicker than their peers in
the armies of Arab states, can make decisions at a speed roughly equivalent to their opposite numbers in IDF tactical units, they are a much more difficult adversary on the battlefield than Egyptian tank commanders or infantry platoon leaders in wars past.
Similarly, if other guerrilla groups successfully emulate Hezbollah’s model, they too will be much more difficult adversaries on the battlefield for the U.S. military than the Iraqi Army in 1991 or 2003.
[…..]
There are several reasons making the fantasy that Hezbollah will ever give up its arms unlikely. The first—and the most understandable—is that the Shia who make up Hezbollah’s constituency think giving up their arms means giving up the hard-won seat at Beirut’s political table earned over the past three decades. The Shia of Lebanon are the country’s historical underclass, and the Shia fear a return to the days when their concerns were largely forgotten by the central government. Without the arms of Hezbollah, they argue, no one in Beirut will care about the concerns of the Shia living in the south, the Bekaa Valley, and the suburbs of Beirut.
The second reason why Hezbollah cannot give up its arms, though, is because so many of the young men who join the organization join to fight. These young men are lured by the promise of fighting Israel, and Hezbollah must worry that if they were to abandon their military campaign against Israel, these young men would simply split from the organization in the same way that so many of the Amal militia’s gunmen left for Hezbollah in the early 1980s. Thus, in order to keep these young men of arms under the same big tent as the rest of the organization, it is necessary to continue some form of armed conflict against Israel.
[…..]
A cult of resistance has developed within Hezbollah, one that makes it very difficult for the organization to ever be at peace. A similar cult of arms exists in the U.S. Marine Corps or the U.S. Army’s light infantry units, of course, but should the U.S. ever be at peace, there is little worry the soldiers and Marines will revolt and form their own splinter organization. That is the worry within Hezbollah, and the way in which violence against Israel has become a necessary part of the organization’s psyche is worrying not only for Israel but also for the Lebanese—both those aligned with Hezbollah and those opposed.
From the perspective of an American, the worry is that this cult of resistance will spread to other guerrilla groups in the region, making peace impossible. There are those within Hezbollah and organizations like Hamas who no doubt argue for a more peaceful track toward coexistence. But coexistence is impossible as long as the cult of resistance precludes it.
Posted in Andrew Exum, Counterinsurgency, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Israel
Begin Jerusalem Post Excerpt
Analysis: Fortress Gaza
July 2, 2008
JONATHAN SPYER , THE JERUSALEM POST
Since the agreement on the tahadiyeh (lull) was reached between Hamas and Israel on June 19, the border crossings between Israel and Gaza have already been closed six times in response to Palestinian rocket fire.
Israeli officials acknowledge that none of these attacks was carried out by Hamas. Hamas, nevertheless, is keeping itself busy.
The organization’s military wing is putting in place preparations based on a comprehensive strategy for facing an expected eventual large IDF operation into Gaza.
Hamas gunmen are training extensively to play their allotted roles within this strategy.
The model for Hamas is Hizbullah’s preparations for and conduct of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The evidence suggests that Hamas is using its uncontested control in Gaza to effect a qualitative change in its abilities and ambitions.
Hamas’s strategy derives at the highest level from the group’s muqawama (resistance) doctrine. According to this view, Israel’s Achilles’ heel is its inability to absorb large numbers of military and civilian casualties. Hamas believes Israel’s will can be broken through attrition and a steady toll of unexpectedly high numbers of both military and civilian casualties.
In the event of a major IDF incursion into Gaza, Hamas would seek to maintain a steady rain of rockets on Israeli communities around the Strip and to break the sense of armored and air invulnerability hitherto enjoyed by Israeli forces engaging with its fighters. Hamas would of course also try to inflict steady losses of 4 to 10 casualties per day on IDF’s ground forces during the fighting. Looking to the 2006 model, the movement’s planners believe that achieving these goals could be sufficient to break Israel’s will.
To make this possible, Hamas is feverishly training as well as acquiring relevant weapons systems – of a type far superior in quality to those previously associated with the organization.
The weapons systems on which Hamas is thought to be currently training in the Gaza Strip include a wire-guided anti-tank missile, probably the AT-3 Sagger, and additional anti-tank guided missiles: the AT-4 Spigot, the tripod-fired AT-5 Spandrel and the shoulder-fired AT-14 Spriggan – all useful against armor. All these systems have ranges of several kilometers.
In addition, Hamas is thought to have brought into Gaza large numbers of RPG-29 Vampir handheld anti-tank grenade launchers with a range of 500 meters, which are capable of penetrating reactive armor and are considered far superior to the RPG 7 systems used by the movement in the past.
Hamas is also developing improvised explosive devices, i.e. bombs. The organization possesses an Iranian-developed, locally-produced system known as the Shawaz explosively-formed penetrator that it says can penetrate 20 cm. of steel. Hamas also claims to possess air defense missiles, though no information could be obtained on their nature or the veracity of the claim. Imports from Iran and Syria and local production are all playing a role in the movement’s development of its arsenal.
In addition to arming Gaza to the teeth, Hamas is recruiting fresh fighters. Once again, the model is Hizbullah, and the intention appears to be to develop a force part-way between a regular army and a guerrilla force, of the type developed under Iranian tutelage by the Shi’ite Lebanese group.
Extensive recruitment has been taking place in the past month. New fighters have been accepted to both the Izzadin Kassam Brigades – Hamas’s long-standing military wing, and to the Executive Force – the newer group created since Hamas’s election victory in January 2006.
The latter force played the key role in Hamas’s rout of Fatah in its 2007 coup. Hamas claims to have around 20,000 men under arms, though some sources suggest that the number may be higher. Again, both Iran and Syria are thought to be playing a role in providing advanced training to cadres from both of these organizations: around 1,000 Hamas men are thought to have trained in one of these countries in the last months.
What does Hamas’s attempt to create “Fortress Gaza” mean? Its political leaders have consolidated their rule internally vis-à-vis other Palestinian forces. They are thought to face a certain problem from yet more radical Sunni Islamist currents among both the rank and file fighters and commanders of their own military organizations.
But for the moment, with no serious internal challenge, Hamas is digging in.
The Hamas rulers believe that Israelis want only peace and quiet, which makes them both vulnerable and deterrable. Thus, Hamas is seeking to create a solid shield around its Gaza fiefdom that can be turned into a weapon of attack at a time and situation of its choosing.
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