IS SYRIA READY FOR PEACE?
November 15, 2007
http://www.tribulationperiod.com/
The Annapolis Peace Conference, set to begin on November 27, should be very interesting and reveal a lot of ulterior individual motivations for better or for worse, hidden by political smoke and mirrors. Survival, future political assignments, and national public voting popularity with additional votes will be among the motivations driving individuals at the conference tables.
The dilemma President Bashar Assad has faced, since he inherited the Syrian Government from his father, has been one which basically can be described quite adequately with a question – How do I hold all this mess together and SURVIVE? If he thinks the acquisition of the Golan Heights his father lost in the 1967 war will enhance his chances
of being able to stay in power, and he can stay in the good graces of his Islamic cronies by making some concessions to Israel while doing so, then he will go for peace.
But of one thing I am certain – whatever sort of peace agreement he would make with Israel, would be phonier than a twenty-one dollar bill, and shorter in duration than an isolated afternoon rain shower in the desert in late afternoon.
I cannot remember as much behind the scenes maneuvering, personal success political motivation, cross purposing confusion, and downright guile spilling out of a peace pot, since the Clinton administration’s final efforts to produce a propped up peace agreement between the PA and Israel.
Whatever comes out of the Annapolis Conference, this final generation is now heading for the eventual last roundup of the Church Age in the Middle East.
Begin Article 1 from Jerusalem Post
Syria reportedly agrees to attend upcoming Mideast summit
Jerusalem Post Staff, THE JERUSALEM POST
November 15, 2007
Syria will be attending the upcoming US-sponsored Mideast summit in Annapolis, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram reported on Thursday.
Quoting a Palestinian source based in Damascus, the report claimed that Syria came to their decision after they received assurances that the United States would openly extend to them a formal invitation to the parley, rather than using discreet channels through the Arab League.
Meanwhile, opposition from Palestinian leaders to Prime Min ister
Ehud Olmert’s demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the “state of the Jews” intensified on Wednesday, threatening to derail the planned post-Annapolis attempt to renew substantive peace negotiations.
Nonetheless, Olmert – who reiterated on Wednesday that there could be no such talks without explicit Palestinian recognition of Israel as the Jewish state
– is confident that the Annapolis joint statement of principles, which is still being negotiated between the two sides, will satisfactorily resolve the issue, The Jerusalem Post was told.
Veteran Palestinian peace negotiator Saeb Erekat said Wednesday that the Palestinians would never formally recognize Israel as the Jewish state.
“Israel can define itself however it sees fit; and if it wishes to call itself a Jewish state, so be it,” he said in an interview with the satellite station Al-Arabiya. “But the Palestinians will never acknowledge Israel’s Jewish identity.”
In similar vein, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salaam Fayad was quoted by Israel Radio as rejecting Olmert’s demand as unacceptable.
On Tuesday, PLO Executive Committee member Yasser Abed Rabbo also dismissed the demand, stating: “It is only a Zionist party that deals with Israel as a Jewish state, and we did not request to be a member of the international Zionism movement.”
Olmert has stressed repeatedly in recent days that there can be no negotiations whatsoever between Israel and the Palestinians until they acknowledge that Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and that he has made this clear to both the Palestinians and the Americans in the run-up to the Annapolis summit scheduled for the end of the month.
According to a statement issued by the Prime Minister’s Office on Wednesday, following Olmert’s meeting with visiting European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, Olmert “referred to Israel’s insistence that the foundation for the post-Annapolis negotiations with the Palestinians be recognition of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.”
Olmert, the statement went on, “made it clear that from Israel’s point of view, this issue is not subject to either negotiations or discussion.”
Earlier this week, Olmert declared that “Israel is a state of the Jewish people. Whoever does not accept this cannot hold any negotiations with me.”
Despite the apparently irreconcilable positions on this issue, the Post was told by well-placed sources on Wednesday night that Olmert believed the Annapolis joint statement would address the matter satisfactorily, enabling negotiations to proceed.
Israel, the sources pointed out, came into being in the wake of the UN General Assembly’s approval 60 years ago of the partition of Palestine “into Jewish and Arab states.” The entire basis of the two-state solution, they added, revolved around the notion of the Jewish state, Israel, alongside the Arab state sought by the Palestinians, Palestine.
“We are not the Israeli nation,” the sources said. “We’re the Jewish state.”
A lot of negative rhetoric was being heard from Palestinian officials
, the sources acknowledged, saying, “They’re going to have to resolve some of those contradictions.”
Begin Article 2 by Ron Ben-Yishai from Internet Sources
IDF believes in Assad
Bush, Olmert may disagree, but army believes Syria ready for peace, Palestinians aren’t
Ron Ben-Yishai
November 13, 2007
The recent cooling off in the relationship between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak is merely the tip of the iceberg; the one that enjoys wide coverage but is less important.
The mutual public insults they have traded, just like the disagreement over the procedural aspects of their meetings with top security officials, reflect not only the preparations they are making ahead of the competition for the premiership. They also attest to a deep and fundamental strategic disagreement over the question of the track Israel should be focusing its diplomatic efforts on in the coming year.
Olmert, with the support of the Mossad, National security Council, and also the American Administration, prefers to focus on an attempt to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. The prime minister is willing to put out feelers on the Syrian track, but he is unwilling to enter substantial and binding negotiations.
On the other hand, Barak, who enjoys the firm support of the IDF General Staff and assistance from the Shin Bet internal security service, believes that the gist of the diplomatic effort must be directed to the Syrian track, while the Palestinian channel should be handled cautiously and be kept on the backburner.
According to the security establishment’s assessment, at this time there is a good chance and substantial need to reach a binding peace agreement with Bashar Assad. According to this approach, the latter would be able to deliver the goods in exchange for the territorial and other concessions he’ll be receiving from Israel. On the other hand, according to Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet, even if Mahmoud Abbas signs an agreement, he would not be able to provide Israel with the level of security it requires. Any fundamental Israeli concessions in an agreement signed with him will constitute an opening position for the next round of negotiations – and a source for more international pressure.
“In the 60th year of its existence, the State of Israel finally has to produce permanent borders that come with a clear return address that we can reach understandings with and finalize binding agreements with,” says a very senior security official. “We can reach this state of affairs with Syria at this time; with the Palestinians, not yet.” According to the same source, a peace agreement with Syria will indirectly affect the Israeli-Palestinian arena as well, because it will disconnect Damascus from Iran, Hizbullah, and Hamas.
“If we don’t at least try to reach an agreement with Syria, we’ll be doing ourselves a disservice,” the security official warned. “All of us know what Syria wants and what previous Israeli governments agreed to give it. It’s clear to me that if we have another war today, we’ll win. But this war will cause terrible destruction and victims on both sides, and when it’s over we’ll sit down at the negotiation table with the Syrians and reach an agreement. So why should we join this march of folly?” he wondered, while alluding to Barbara Tuchman’s well-known book, which among other things addresses bloody wars that could have been prevented.
“Why don’t we try to enter negotiations at this point already in order to reach the same result we would be achieving after the war? In my estimate, today Syria is ready for such talks,” the security official said.
Lessons from the bombing
This approach, which as noted contradicts the views of the prime minister, was formulated in the IDF for many months, but received a boost mostly after the aerial assault in Syria.
Early this year, Military Intelligence already estimated that Assad means what he says. The question that remained open was whether the Syrian president wanted peace talks with Israel in order to reach a binding peace deal, or whether his only intention was to embark on talks for the sake of talks.
The Mossad, for example, argued that Bashar is interested in dialogue in order to end his isolation and so that the international community ease the pressure on him over matters such as the flow of terrorists from Syria to Iraq and the assassination of former Lebanese PM Hariri. The Mossad estimated that Assad is not ready for genuine peace moves in exchange for an Israeli willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights. He only wants to talk. However, officials in the IDF’s intelligence branch recently reached the conclusion that Bashar is ready and willing to deliver the goods.
This was a result of information that points to the following trends:
1. Syria is uncomfortable with the Iranian bear hug, which manifests itself in all areas of life, including security and economics. Assad is unhappy to serve as a pawn on Tehran’s chessboard on its way to a nuclear bomb.
2. Assad wants to see continued economic development in his country. This growth, which constitutes the main motive for the popular support for his regime vis-à-vis Islamic radicals, has been based to a large extent on revenues from oil fields in northeastern Syria. However, output is declining.
Assad needs European and American investments in order to survive economically and politically – and he will only be seeing this should he disengage from the “axis of evil.” Peace with Israel may also grant him the Golan, and also free him from the status of a pariah state that is dangerous to invest in and maintain ties with.
3. The successful bombing of the Syrian nuclear site, according to foreign reports at least, made it clear to Assad that his attempts to acquire such weapons in the aims of reaching strategic equality with Israel are doomed for failure. The bombing also exposed Syria to additional criticism on the part of the international community and further deepened its isolation. Military intelligence officials estimate that this could lead Bashar to follow in the footsteps of Libyan leader Gaddafi. The latter, in a complete turnaround, abandoned his nuclear program upon its exposure and embarked on moves of reconciliation that brought Libya back into the family of nations.
The senior security official referred to this by saying: “We must treat Bashar in a manner that would turn him into a repenting Gaddafi, or alternately, present him as a pariah and a danger to regional peace just like Saddam Hussein. In any case, we’ll gain from such move.”
4. The bombing of the site made it clear to the Syrian regime that a confrontation with Israel could be destructive. The regime realized how transparent Syria is to the Israeli intelligence establishment, and how vulnerable its national infrastructure and missile arsenals can be in the face of the Israeli Air Force. At this time Bashar understands that despite the arms deals and military preparations, he is still far from the day where he would be able to force Israel, through missile and rocket barrages, to withdraw from the Golan. On the other hand, a harsh Israeli response could cause him and the Alawite sect to lose their grip on power. Military intelligence officials believe that Bashar has recently sobered up from the belligerent enthusiasm that overcame him in the wake of the Second Lebanon War. At this time he re alizes th
at Syria as a state, as opposed to Hizbullah, cannot afford to get entangled in an all-out confrontation with Israel.
Containment in Gaza, peace with Assad
As a result of these assessments, the security establishment has formulated a strategy that argues for “containment in the Palestinian arena and diplomatic initiative on the Syrian track.” The practical implication of such “containment” is a continued military effort aimed at curbing Palestinian terrorism, alongside economic and diplomatic moves aimed at boosting Mahmoud Abbas’ status. Should sanctions and military activities in Gaza fail to curb the Qassam fire, the IDF will embark on a wide-scale operation in the Strip aimed at destroying terror infrastructure and achieving intelligence supremacy. However, as a condition to such operation, the IDF demands large forces to be used for a lengthy period of time. Otherwise, according to estimates by top military officials, it would be impossible to achieve substantial accomplishments.
Barak and the defense establishment understand that Israel cannot afford to stay away from the Annapolis conference. However, they demand that Israel insist on implementation of the Road Map initiative in all matters pertaining to the dismantling of Palestinian terror infrastructure as a pre-requisite to any diplomatic progress. They also demand that understandings reached at the conference be general and non-binding. The time for a deal with the Palestinians will come after Israel will possess a reliable system for intercepting rockets and missiles, after Hamastan will cease to exist in Gaza, and when Abbas enjoys effective control on the ground.
But before all that, based on the same school of thought, Israel must embark on negotiations with the Syrians. Initially this should be done surreptitiously, through mediators (such as Turkey, for example,) and later openly.
Following the Annapolis summit, say those who back talks with Syria, it might be worthwhile to convene a special international summit that would be dedicated to this track.
This will provide the international framework and Arab legitimacy for a possible peace agreement between Jerusalem and Damascus.
According to foreign media reports, initial contacts are already underway, in preparation for convening such conference in Moscow. For the time being, this approach is getting the cold shoulder from the prime minister and US Administration.
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